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Majestic Law and the Subjective Stop 
Kyron J. Huigens* 
Justice John Paul Stevens subscribed to “a majestic conception” of the 
Constitution.  This Article articulates and defends that vision.  Majestic law 
and legal reasoning characteristically involve frank moral reasoning, such 
as one finds in the Eighth Amendment’s “evolving standards of decency” 
test for proportionate punishment, or in Due Process formulations such as 
an appeal to “immutable principles of justice, which inhere in the very idea 
of free government.”   
The principal antagonist to majestic law is the belief that moral 
values, norms, and judgments are “subjective.”  That is, these moral 
commitments are thought to be irrational, arbitrary, prejudicial, mere 
intuitions, emotional reactions, personal instead of public, or supernatural 
instead of empirical.  This view of moral commitments bars them from use 
in legal reasoning.  In other words, it imposes a “subjective stop.”   
The subjective stop is premised on a mistake.  Moral values, norms, 
and judgments are indeed subjective.  It does not follow, however, that 
these moral commitments are irrational, arbitrary, or in any way unfit for 
legal reasoning.   
The nature and status of moral commitments is the subject matter of 
metaethics, and the subjectivity of moral commitments is a topic of 
controversy in metaethics.  The subjective stop rests on a primitive 
emotivism: the view that morality is a set of visceral “boo” or “hooray” 
exclamations.  This view of morality, however, has no defenders in 
contemporary metaethics.  This Article relies on two alternative 
subjectivist metaethical theories to defend majestic law and condemn the 
subjective stop.  Allan Gibbard’s norm expressivism explains that, while 
moral commitments are expressions of emotion, we adjudicate our moral 
disagreements rationally.  A moral norm or judgment is wrong if it is 
rational only under a system of norms that we cannot rationally accept.  
Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism starts from the premise that morality is 
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subjective in the most fundamental sense: it is something that human 
beings project onto the world.  Blackburn argues that this changes nothing 
in what we think or how we act morally.  The world onto which we project 
value imposes limitations on morality, and projection is subject to its own 
logic, which imposes further constraints. 
The upshot of each of these theories is a view of moral commitments 
as subjective, yet rational and either true or false.  Under these viable 
subjectivist theories of metaethics, we have no need to reduce moral 
commitments to descriptive terms before we allow them to operate in 
legal reasoning.  Justice Scalia’s insistence that the “evolving standards of 
decency” test should give way to an inquiry into historical and 
contemporary practices in punishment rested on a subjective stop—and 
was mistaken because of it.  We can determine what cruel punishment is, 
and to frame that question in terms of decency is a meaningful and 
enlightening move.  Due Process does not call only for a historical inquiry 
into past and currently prevailing legal processes in the United States; it 
also calls for rational inquiry into the truth about “a fair and enlightened 
system of justice,” or “the concept of ordered liberty.”  To say a handgun is 
not “critical to leading a life of autonomy, dignity, or political equality” 
might or might not be true, but it is not enough to say, with Justice Scalia, 
“Who says?”  To say this is to impose a full subjective stop.  More 
importantly, it is, as Justice Stevens argued, an abdication of judicial 
responsibility that has led to the loss of majestic law.  
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The Court seems to assume that the Fourth Amendment—and 
particularly the exclusionary rule, which effectuates the Amendment’s 
commands—has the limited purpose of deterring police misconduct.  Both 
the constitutional text and the history of its adoption and interpretation 
identify a more majestic conception.1  
 
The concept of due process which permits the invention and use of 
prosecutorial devices not included in the Constitution makes Due Process 
reflect the subjective or even whimsical notions of a majority of this Court 
as from time to time constituted.  Due Process under the prevailing 
doctrine is what the judges say it is; and it differs from judge to judge, from 
court to court.  This notion of Due Process makes it a tool of the activists 
who respond to their own visceral reactions in deciding what is fair, 
decent, or reasonable.2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Justice Stevens’s invocation of a “majestic conception” of the Fourth 
Amendment is unpersuasive on its face.  The word “majestic” suggests 
an inspiring vision of the Constitution, and who could object?  This kind 
of thing is not unheard of in Supreme Court opinions.  Even so, the 
pragmatic author of an opinion that takes the absence of deterrence to 
be sufficient reason to suspend the exclusionary rule would hardly grant 
the majesty of the Constitution a substantive role in constitutional 
interpretation.  Consider also an earlier instance of the same kind of 
rhetoric, courtesy of Justice Brennan:  
By remaining within its redoubt of empiricism and by basing 
the rule solely on the deterrence rationale, the Court has 
robbed the rule of legitimacy.  A doctrine that is explained as 
 
 1 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg 
echoed Stevens’s complaint.  “Others have described ‘a more majestic conception’ of the 
Fourth Amendment and its adjunct, the exclusionary rule.  Protective of the fundamental 
‘right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ the 
Amendment ‘is a constraint on the power of the sovereign, not merely on some of its 
agents.’  I share that vision of the Amendment.”  Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 
151–52 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 2 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 505 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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if it were an empirical proposition but for which there is only 
limited empirical support is both inherently unstable and an 
easy mark for critics.3  
A pragmatic judge ensconced in a “redoubt of empiricism” would not 
mind the metaphor; it might even be appealing.  But it seems an equally 
safe bet that she would set a strict boundary between constitutional 
governance by deterrence on one side and literary merit on the other.  
And the problem is not only “redoubt.”  The idea that anything other 
than empiricism could determine law died more than a century ago.4  So 
the more we regard these phrases as rhetorical flourishes, the better.  
There is nothing wrong with a little style in a judicial opinion, but no one 
expects literary style to play a role in constitutional interpretation or 
governance.  If the majestic Constitution and the redoubt of empiricism 
are literary devices, then there really is no reason to take them seriously 
at all.   
The problem is that, in context, Justice Stevens seems to regard 
“majestic” as a genuine constitutional virtue, and Justice Brennan seems 
to believe that “empiricism” really is a constitutional vice.   
Whether Justice Stevens is right or wrong, it is not difficult to see 
what majestic law is supposed to be.  In United States v. Leon—the 
decision that prompted Justice Brennan’s criticism and from which 
Justice Stevens also dissented—the Court ignored the moral 
foundations of the Fourth Amendment: the dignity inherent in privacy;5 
the autonomy inherent in property;6 and the integrity of the judiciary 
itself.7  Unlike the Leon decision’s austere, exclusive concern with the 
deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule, majestic law recognizes moral 
values such as dignity, autonomy, and integrity—and also justice, 
fairness, decency, freedom of conscience, and freedom from cruelty—on 
their own terms.  That is, it allows the intrinsic features of these 
 
 3 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 943 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).   
 4 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465 (1897) 
(“The fallacy to which I refer is the notion that the only force at work in the development 
of the law is logic.”).  
 5 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (“In the home, our cases 
show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying 
government eyes.”).  
 6 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (“It is not the breaking of his 
doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but 
it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and 
private property . . . .”). 
 7 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (“Our decision, founded on reason and 
truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, 
to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, 
to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice.”). 
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values—their etymology, history, conception, and extension—a 
determining role in legal reasoning. 
As Justice Brennan suggests, doing this seems to require a 
justification beyond that which empiricism can provide.  It is difficult to 
see, however, what such a justification could be—a difficulty usually 
expressed by saying that moral values are not “objective,” but are, 
instead, “subjective” in the sense of their being irrational, arbitrary, 
intuitive, emotional, prejudicial, personal instead of public, or 
supernatural instead of empirical.  Feelings are not facts, as the saying 
goes.  Or, as Justice Douglas put it, a legal conclusion must be wrong if it 
is based on “visceral reactions” or “the subjective or even whimsical 
notions of a majority of this Court as from time to time constituted.”8  So 
however much we might wish we could use robust moral values and 
norms in constitutional adjudication, we must refrain from doing so 
because they simply do not exist or do not exist in the right way.  
Majestic law is usually unpersuasive, apparently illegitimate, and in all 
events unattainable because it is subject to this necessary limitation. 
This Article rejects this limitation and argues that we can give our 
moral commitments to decency, fairness, integrity, and similar values a 
dispositive role in legal reasoning, including constitutional adjudication.  
This is neither irrational nor unwise.  These values are not “subjective” 
in any pejorative sense.  They are indeed subjective, but to recognize 
their subjectivity is not to prioritize the private over the public, to resign 
ourselves to irreconcilable disagreement, to depart from the realm of 
fact, or to cede any measure of rationality.  We can confidently rely on 
moral values in legal reasoning because their subjectivity is benign, not 
malignant.  A majestic conception of the Constitution is within our grasp 
and always has been.  
This Article describes the loss of majestic law and the barrier to its 
reacquisition in terms of a “subjective stop.”  A subjective stop is an 
assertion that a moral commitment is impermissible in law and legal 
reasoning because it is “subjective”—or a “value judgment,” “mere 
opinion,” “intuition,” “emotional reaction,” “personal prejudice,” or 
“personal preference.”  The word “stop” as it is used here is unusual, but 
not unheard of.  Criminal law scholars will recognize it from their 
reading of H.L.A. Hart’s “Prolegomenon to the Principles of 
Punishment.”  When it came to describing legal punishment, Hart 
rejected a “definitional stop.”9  A definition concerns the meaning of a 
 
 8 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 505 (1960). 
 9 See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 5 
(2d ed. 2008) (“The chief importance of listing these sub-standard cases is to prevent 
the use of what I shall call the ‘definitional stop’ . . . .”). 
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word, which is a normative enterprise different from—and not 
necessarily enlightening about—the normative enterprise of legal 
punishment.  To focus on the definitions of “legal” and “punishment” 
restricts our understanding of the practice of legal punishment itself.  In 
other words, it stops the analysis prematurely.  Similarly, it is thought to 
be enough for me to say, “That’s subjective,” to establish your belief’s 
irrationality, and so its invalidity in any argument.  “Everyone knows” 
that morality is an emotional reaction or a supernatural prejudice.10  The 
assertion that a moral commitment invoked in a legal argument is 
“subjective” stops legal arguments prematurely; hence, “subjective 
stop.”   
To explain and debunk the subjective stop requires an excursion 
into the field of metaethics—that is, into the study of morality’s standing 
in the world.  The subjective stop raises and answers a question about 
the status of our moral commitments.  Are these commitments facts 
amenable to reason, or are they nothing more than the expression of 
feelings?  The subjective stop assumes the latter.  This question is 
related to a cluster of issues that also fall under the heading of 
metaethics.  Are moral values real things, in the sense that they exist 
independently of what we think and believe, or is their existence 
dependent on us—perhaps even on the least rational part of us?  Are 
moral values natural things or are they supernatural—a category not 
limited to religious beliefs—and beyond the reach of empirical inquiry?  
Are moral claims meaningful at all, or, even if meaningful, just a strange 
pretense?  On the second, third, and fourth questions, there is no 
popular consensus, mostly because these questions seldom arise in 
public matters.  On the first, however, there seems to be a common 
understanding—in law and elsewhere in the public realm—that 
morality is subjective in a pejorative sense.  If this were so, then reliance 
on moral values, norms, terms, explanations, and judgments in law 
would be, if not illegitimate, still to be minimized in legal reasoning and 
adjudication—and avoided if at all possible.  This discrediting, 
avoidance, and minimization of morality in legal reasoning and 
adjudication is the reason we have lost majestic law.  It is not majestic 
law that should be discredited, avoided, and minimized, however; it is 
the flawed metaethical theories responsible for its loss. 
 
 
 10 See PETER RAILTON, FACTS, VALUES, AND NORMS: ESSAYS TOWARD A MORALITY OF 
CONSEQUENCE 3 (2003) (“So common has it become in secular intellectual culture to treat 
morality as subjective or conventional that most of us now have difficulty imagining 
what it might be like for there to be facts to which moral judgments answer.”). 
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Part II, following this Introduction, will provide a sense of what is 
at stake in the conflict between majestic law and the subjective stop.  
The law of confessions under the Due Process Clauses and the Self-
Incrimination Clause has devolved from a commitment to protecting 
freedom of conscience and the dignity of the person to a grudging 
application of narrow rules that deprive the government of some 
evidence in criminal cases.  The truth-finding function of investigations 
and prosecutions has been prioritized over all other values short of a 
ban on torture, and setting this priority has been facilitated by the 
subjective stop’s denigration of those values. 
In Part III, majestic law will be defined, and its principal features 
will be described.  Majestic law permits moral commitments—moral 
values, norms, terms, explanations, or judgments—to play a substantive 
role in legal reasoning.  A moral commitment has legal authority only if 
it has been positively enacted by a legislature or high court, formulated 
to comply with the rule of law, and subjected to institutional constraints 
such as the separation of powers.  These moral commitments, however, 
need not have been reduced to nonprescriptive terms, such as “revealed 
preferences” or tallies of various jurisdictions’ doctrines.  Instead, they 
appear in unreduced form, so that their intrinsic features play a 
substantive role in legislation and judicial decisions.  In majestic law, 
moral values such as justice, fairness, integrity, dignity, decency, 
autonomy, freedom of conscience, moral proportionality, and the 
condemnation of cruelty operate on their own terms.   
The central premise of the subjective stop, which is the subject of 
Part IV, is the belief that reliance on unreduced moral commitments is 
fatal to the rationality of law.  The principal features of the subjective 
stop are a hard subjective/objective distinction and a naive 
reductionism that purports to render subjective values as objective facts 
that then serve unproblematically in legal reasoning.  These arguments 
come in two varieties.  In a full subjective stop argument, the accusation 
that a value or evaluation is subjective—or a “personal preference,” an 
“emotional reaction,” or a “mere opinion”—is deployed as a putative 
knock-down argument.  In a presumptive subjective stop argument, the 
accusation that a value or evaluation is subjective is intended to impose 
a presumption that the value or evaluation in question is irrational or 
arbitrary, and therefore impermissible in legal reasoning unless it can 
be shown to be otherwise—preferably by reducing the evaluation to a 
description.  “Decency,” for example, becomes “a revealed preference for 
decency.”   
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Both kinds of subjective stop arguments conceal a set of 
assumptions about the nature of morality that underwrites the 
argument against the use of moral values, norms, explanations, or 
judgments in legal reasoning.  Part V explains why a moral 
commitment’s being “subjective” is not the fatal defect in legal reasoning 
that the subjective stop supposes.  The familiar “it’s all subjective” is a 
metaethical statement—a statement about morality, in contrast to a 
statement of morality, such as “murder is evil.”  The notion that reliance 
on unreduced moral commitments is fatal to the rationality of law is 
supported by the emotivism of A.J. Ayer: the position that moral 
statements are meaningless exclamations on the order of, “Boo theft!” 
and, “Hooray charity!”11  Ayer’s metaethics has never commanded much 
support among scholars because it has flaws that Ayer himself 
acknowledged within a decade of advancing his theory.  Why this 
flawed, failed metaethics took hold in law and the popular mind remains 
a mystery.  It is clear, however, that it is past time for law to move on.   
More recent theories recognize that morality is subjective, but 
reject the idea that morality is therefore irrational or arbitrary.  Allan 
Gibbard’s norm expressivism holds that we express emotions in our 
moral norms and judgments, but that, in doing so, we express support 
for normative systems under which these individual moral 
commitments are deemed rational.12  It might seem that this merely 
shifts the fatal subjectivity of morality up one level, but Gibbard explains 
how moral systems are empirically grounded as well as rational, and 
how this grounding extends to individual moral norms and judgments.13  
Simon Blackburn’s “quasi-realism” offers a more radical subjectivist 
metaethics that starts from David Hume’s belief that we project value, 
including moral value, onto the world.14  Blackburn explains that 
Humean projectivism changes nothing in how we morally think, speak, 
and act.15  The world onto which we project value does not contain 
morality, but it does impose constraints on our moral beliefs.  Projected 
value itself has its own logic, and we earn the right to treat morality as 
“objective” when we defend our moral commitments in terms of 
coherence and a body of epistemic virtues in moral reasoning.  These 
epistemic virtues are by and large the virtues of sound empirical 
 
 11 See ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC 107 (2d ed. 1946) (comparing 
moral judgments to the use of exclamation points). 
 12 See ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF NORMATIVE JUDGMENT 
(1990). 
 13 Id. at 154–56, 181–82. 
 14 See SIMON BLACKBURN, SPREADING THE WORD 170–71 (1984). 
 15 Id. at 211. 
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inquiry: simplicity, responsiveness to experiment, utility, theoretical 
elegance, observation, induction, and so on. 
Part VI defends majestic law by appealing to these subjectivist 
metaethical theories.  Judges, lawyers, and others engaged in legal 
reasoning appeal to moral commitments that are founded on subjective 
responses to events.  In majestic law and legal reasoning, they do this 
without purporting to reduce these moral commitments to descriptive 
form.  For example, we can see that the familiar, very majestic, 
formulations of Due Process—such as rules that contribute to “a fair and 
enlightened system of justice” 16 or that reflect “immutable principles of 
justice, which inhere in the very idea of free government”17—can lay 
claim to moral rationality and moral truth.  Majestic Due Process 
standards reflect complex normative systems under which the moral 
commitments expressed in these standards, and the decisions relying 
on them, are rational.  They also constitute a coherent system, as law 
(mostly) is, and they exhibit epistemic virtues, as law does (most of the 
time). 
Finally, many of the examples given in this Article are taken from 
the case of McDonald v. City of Chicago,18 in which the Supreme Court 
incorporated the Second Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Clause and applied it to the states.  Part VII demonstrates 
the depth to which Justice Alito’s plurality opinion and Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence are anchored by the subjective stop.  The analysis 
presented here permits us to revive the lost Due Process standard of the 
“civilized legal system,” which Chicago’s brief attempted but failed to 
revive.19  Once this standard is formulated properly, two possibilities 
arise.  We can rebut the objections to the civilization standard of Due 
Process lodged by Justices Alito and Scalia so that the Second 
Amendment is not incorporated.  Alternatively, we can use the frank 
moral reasoning that is characteristic of majestic law to explain what is 
permitted under the incorporated Second Amendment. 
 
 16 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 17 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932) (citing Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 
389 (1989)). 
 18 561 U.S. 742 (2010) 
 19 Id. at 780 (“Municipal respondents’ main argument is nothing less than a plea to 
disregard 50 years of incorporation precedent and return (presumably for this case 
only) to a bygone era.”). 
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II.  THE MAJESTIC LAW OF CONFESSIONS, LOST 
Before embarking on the analysis of majestic law and the subjective 
stop, one should have a sense of what is at stake.  In the 1970s and 80s, 
the law of confessions under the Due Process Clauses and the Self-
Incrimination Clause devolved—precipitously, from a historical 
perspective—from a concern with the dignity of the person and freedom 
of conscience to an exclusive concern with coercion.20  It was as if these 
moral commitments had been abandoned as cognizable values in the 
law.  This is because they had been. 
In his classic history of the Fifth Amendment, Leonard Levy found 
the roots of the Self-Incrimination Clause in the inquisitorial procedures 
of Britain’s ecclesiastical courts and the Star Chamber.21  The chief abuse 
was not torture.  It was, instead, the use of the oath ex officio.  The oath 
was a promise to tell the truth, and its defenders professed not to 
understand how this could be objectionable.22  This response was 
disingenuous because it ignored essential context for which they were 
responsible.23  The oath ex officio was a feature of an inquisition 
commenced by an ecclesiastical court or royal council; usually upon 
denunciation by witnesses whom the accused was not allowed to 
confront; on charges, if any, of which the accused was not informed; and 
under questioning in private.24  The accused was questioned by learned 
judges or councilors, who were able to elicit answers tailored to 
corroborate the accusations of the anonymous witnesses or to support 
as yet undetermined charges.25  The oath ex officio and inquisitorial 
procedures were used for centuries to root out religious heretics.  After 
Henry VIII brought religion under the control of the Crown, the 
persecution of heretics merged with the persecution of political 
dissenters.  The oath ex officio was the subject of legislation that 
alternately approved and abolished it, depending on who was in power, 
from 1236 to 1641.26 
 
 20 See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977) (“Absent some officially 
coerced self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not violated by even the most 
damning admissions.”).  
 21 See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION 42 (1986) (“[T]he prerogative courts’ employing the oath ex officio, the 
inquisitional oath, provoked the struggle that eventually led to the creation of the right 
against self-incrimination.”). 
 22 See id. at 67–68. 
 23 See id. at 46–47. 
 24 See id. at 50–51. 
 25 See id. at 66–67. 
 26 See id. at 46–82. 
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The canonical statement of the principles drawn from this history 
is found in an editor’s note by Thomas Leach in the 1787 edition of 
Hawkins’s Pleas of the Crown:  
A confession, therefore, whether made upon an official 
examination or in discourse with private persons, which is 
obtained from a defendant either by the flattery of hope, or by 
the impressions of fear, however slightly the emotions may be 
implanted is not admissible evidence; for the law will not 
suffer a prisoner to be made the deluded instrument of his 
own conviction.27 
The Court has quoted this language many times in Due Process and Self-
Incrimination Clause cases.  More precisely, it has quoted the last clause 
of the sentence.28  The sentence as a whole expressly describes the 
privilege not to speak as protecting against much more than coercion.29  
It describes protection against inducements as well as threats and 
against fear no matter how slight.  The words “deluded instrument” also 
do not describe coercion; they describe a person who has been 
manipulated or deceived.  Given the ecclesiastical and political uses of 
the oath and inquisition, it describes a violation of conscience.   
Levy’s history points toward another relevant evil: the violation of 
human dignity.  To take the oath ex officio confidently or without 
appreciating its consequences was to be deluded, to be a fool on a grand 
scale.  Every other option represented a loss of dignity in the form of a 
 
 27 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 604 n.2 (Thomas Leach ed., 6th ed. 1787) 
(citation omitted). 
 28 See, e.g., Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 551–52 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 656 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Estelle v. Smith, 451 
U.S. 454, 462 (1981). 
 29 Significantly, the sentence is quoted in full in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 
547 (1897).  Bram is considered both a precursor to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966) and an outlier in the law of confessions because coercion was not employed.  As 
one scholar recently noted,  
Since Bram, the Supreme Court has stressed the unimportance of its 
holding, finding that Bram “does not state the standard for 
determining the voluntariness of a confession.” Moreover, Bram 
located the right against use of coerced confessions in the Self-
Incrimination Clause when today the prohibition on use of coerced 
testimony fits within the Due Process Clause.   
Neal Modi, Note, Toward an International Right Against Self-Incrimination: Expanding 
the Fifth Amendment’s “Compelled” to Foreign Compulsion, 103 VA. L. REV. 961, 989 n.121 
(2017) (citations omitted).  Up to and including the decision in Miranda, however, the 
Court did not see the Self-Incrimination Clause as a bar exclusively to coercion.  Dignity 
was a cognizable value.  The Bram Court noted, particularly, that he was questioned by 
an interrogator who “proceeded to take extraordinary liberties with him; he stripped 
him.”  168 U.S. at 539.  Bram is an outlier only if one assumes that human dignity is an 
outlier value in the law of confessions.  
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humbling theft of agency.  To take the oath with knowledge of the 
consequences was to surrender control over self-determination 
unambiguously.  To retain one’s integrity by refusing to take the oath 
was to sentence oneself to imprisonment, banishment, or death.  To take 
the oath and attempt to appease the inquisitor was, for religious 
dissenters and political dissenters alike, to abandon one’s deepest 
beliefs.  To take the oath and lie was to condemn oneself to divine 
retribution, corporeal retribution, or both.  In the context of questioning 
by superiors of church and state, these were all acts of abasement. 
Police interrogations today resemble inquisitorial questioning on 
an oath ex officio.30  Interrogators with knowledge of the law question 
ignorant suspects in private, often upon denunciation by witnesses 
whom the suspect is not allowed to confront, on charges yet to be 
determined.  They do not administer an oath.  Instead, they 
misrepresent and mislead.  They insist that the suspect must tell the 
truth, with a suggestion that this will resolve matters.  They have a free 
hand in reducing any suspect to “a deluded instrument of his own 
conviction” by means of lies and tricks, including the false friend; bad-
faith spiritual advice; the lie that an alleged accomplice has confessed; 
and the refusal to grant friends, family, and unrequested counsel access 
to the suspect without his knowledge.31  It should not be surprising, 
then, that the United States Supreme Court has not quoted Hawkins’s 
Pleas of the Crown in a majority opinion since 1981, in Estelle v. Smith.32  
This is largely because the historical values that Levy and Leach 
describe—a preference for adversarial instead of inquisitorial 
procedures and the protection of conscience and dignity—are much 
broader than the sole purpose assigned to the right to Due Process and 
the Self-Incrimination Clause today: protection against coercion.   
The historical values described by Levy were routinely 
acknowledged by the Supreme Court as late as the 1960s.  In Rogers v. 
Richmond, in 1961, the Court explained that coercion, “either physical 
or psychological,” is banned, “not because such confessions are unlikely 
to be true but because the methods used to extract them offend an 
underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is 
 
 30 See Kyron Huigens, Custodial Compulsion, 99 B.U. L. REV. 523, 560–69 (2019) 
(describing recommended techniques for, and actual practice of, custodial 
interrogation). 
 31 See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986) (“Because neither the letter nor 
purposes of Miranda require this additional handicap on otherwise permissible 
investigatory efforts, we are unwilling to expand the Miranda rules to require the police 
to keep the suspect abreast of the status of his legal representation.”). 
 32 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981). 
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an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system.”33  The Court went on to 
explain that, “[t]o be sure, confessions cruelly extorted may be and have 
been, to an unascertained extent, found to be untrustworthy.  But the 
constitutional principle of excluding confessions that are not voluntary 
does not rest on this consideration.”34  This reasoning was in line with 
Chambers v. Florida, decided in 1940, in which Justice Black wrote for 
the Court that, “[t]he determination to preserve an accused’s right to 
procedural Due Process sprang in large part from knowledge of the 
historical truth that the rights and liberties of people accused of crime 
could not be safely entrusted to secret inquisitorial processes,”35 and 
that “[t]yrannical governments had immemorially utilized dictatorial 
criminal procedure and punishment to make scape goats of the weak, or 
of helpless political, religious, or racial minorities and those who 
differed, who would not conform and who resisted tyranny.”36  In other 
words, the Due Process Clauses protected not just freedom from 
coercion, but also freedom of conscience and the dignity of the 
vulnerable.  In 1960, in Blackburn v. Alabama, the Court said that the 
language of “involuntariness” in its confession cases—which is now 
taken to refer solely to coercion—refers to “a complex of values [that] 
underlies the stricture against use by the state of confessions which, by 
way of convenient shorthand, this Court terms involuntary.”37  
Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in Miranda v. Arizona fully reflects 
this understanding of interrogation and confessions.  Following a long 
description of modern interrogation techniques, he wrote: “To be sure, 
this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human 
dignity.”38 After reviewing the historical antecedents of the privilege, 
beginning with “the Star Chamber oath”—that is, the oath ex 
officio—Warren concluded: 
[T]he constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the 
respect a government—state or federal—must accord to the 
dignity and integrity of its citizens.  To maintain a ‘fair state-
individual balance,’ to require the government ‘to shoulder 
the entire load,’ to respect the inviolability of the human 
personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice 
demands that the government seeking to punish an individual 
 
 33 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540–41 (1961); see also Watts v. Indiana, 338 
U.S. 49, 54 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.) (“Ours is the accusatorial as opposed to the 
inquisitorial system.”). 
 34 Id. at 541.  
 35 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 237 (1940). 
 36 Id. at 236. 
 37 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960) (emphasis added). 
 38 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966). 
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produce the evidence against him by its own independent 
labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of 
compelling it from his own mouth.39 
Miranda is a byword for judicial activism,40 and in the remedies it 
prescribed, it might have been.41  The effort to preserve human dignity, 
personal integrity, and fairness, however, was firmly grounded in recent 
precedent, and that body of precedent was firmly grounded in history.   
This Article is not about the law of confessions or Miranda, but its 
thesis can be framed as a question about Miranda, the Self-Incrimination 
Clause, and Due Process.  What happened to dignity, integrity, fairness, 
and freedom of conscience?  Obviously the post-Warren Court has been 
less protective of the individual in any number of ways.  It might be less 
obvious, however, that the Court has refused to engage with moral 
values directly, on their own terms, in its legal reasoning.  It has 
denigrated not only dignity, integrity, fairness, and freedom of 
conscience but also justice, decency, autonomy, moral proportionality in 
punishment, and the condemnation of cruelty.  It has portrayed these 
moral commitments as presenting a threat to law, by virtue of their 
being, purportedly, irrational, arbitrary, prejudicial, mere intuitions, 
simple emotional reactions, personal instead of public, or supernatural 
instead of empirical.   
A course correction was to be expected when Richard Nixon 
appointed four Justices to the Supreme Court.  But a course correction 
in law is one thing.  A course correction that wipes out an entire set of 
moral values, an understanding of what moral values are, and a style of 
legal reasoning about them, is something else entirely.   
 
 39 Id. at 460. 
 40 See Corey Rayburn Yung, Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of Judicial 
Activism in the Federal Courts, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2011) (“The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Miranda v. Arizona has been criticized as embodying the judicial activism of 
the Warren Court.”). 
 41 See Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article 
III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 100, 145 (1985) (“While a rebuttable presumption of 
involuntariness absent the warnings arguably could be defended on the implied powers 
theory advanced here, the conclusive presumption that the Court established exceeds 
the limits of this theory.”). 
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III.  MAJESTIC LAW 
A.  The Definition of Majestic Law 
As noted in the Introduction, “majestic law” is not a literary style.  
The term refers to a style of legal reasoning and the body of law that 
such reasoning produces—a body of law that crosses the boundaries of 
many legal doctrines.  The difference between a literary style and a style 
of legal reasoning is that the latter has substantive legal consequences. 
In simplest terms, majestic legal reasoning is characterized by the 
frank use of moral language.  Here is an example from Justice Warren’s 
opinion in Miranda v. Arizona:   
Thus we may view the historical development of the privilege 
as one which groped for the proper scope of governmental 
power over the citizen.  As a ‘noble principle often transcends 
its origins,’ the privilege has come rightfully to be recognized 
in part as an individual’s substantive right, a ‘right to a private 
enclave where he may lead a private life.  That right is the 
hallmark of our democracy.’  We have recently noted that the 
privilege against self-incrimination—the essential mainstay 
of our adversary system—is founded on a complex of values 
. . . .  All these policies point to one overriding thought: the 
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the 
respect a government—state or federal—must accord to the 
dignity and integrity of its citizens.42 
The complex of values that Warren refers to consists of moral values.  
He invokes nobility, dignity, personal integrity, and the autonomy 
inherent in privacy.  He calls on all four values in such a way that they 
provide essential support to Miranda’s legal rule.  This is not to say that 
majestic legal reasoning dictated the outcome of Miranda.  The style of 
reasoning and the moral values invoked are no less evident in Justice 
White’s Miranda dissent: “Without the reasonably effective 
performance of the task of preventing private violence and retaliation, 
it is idle to talk about human dignity and civilized values.”43  Justice 
White does not say it is idle to talk about dignity because there is 
something suspect about dignity as such, or about dignity’s role in legal 
reasoning.  He takes moral value seriously and is engaged in majestic 
legal reasoning no less than Justice Warren is. 
 
 42 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460. 
 43 Id. at 540. 
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To take moral value seriously is not a bad way to describe majestic 
legal reasoning, but we can be more precise.  In majestic law, moral 
commitments appear in unreduced form, so that their intrinsic features 
play a substantive role in legislation and judicial decisions.  A moral 
commitment is a moral value, norm, term, explanation, or judgment.  A 
moral commitment appears in unreduced form when it has not been 
translated (purportedly) from prescriptive to descriptive terms.  For 
example, to say that the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality 
requirement is satisfied if a punishment reflects a revealed preference 
for dignity would be to reduce dignity to descriptive terms.44  To say that 
a moral commitment appears in unreduced form in majestic law is not 
to say it appears in unmediated form.  A moral commitment can have 
legal authority only if it has been positively enacted by a legislature or 
high court, formulated to comply with the rule of law, and subjected to 
institutional constraints such as the separation of powers.  The moral 
commitments of majestic law have legal authority because they are 
mediated by law.  They have moral significance because they are 
unreduced.  
To say that a moral commitment’s intrinsic features play a 
substantive role in legislation and judicial decisions is to say that its 
etymology, history, conception, or extension form part of a legal 
argument, interpretation, or decision.  For example, the Eighth 
Amendment requires proportionate punishment.  This proportionality 
is a moral value, not a numerical one.  A legal analysis of proportionality 
in punishment will begin with a conceptual distinction between ordinal 
and cardinal proportionality.  Cardinal proportionality is 
proportionality in absolute terms, which for criminal law is captured in 
the words, “Let the punishment fit the crime.”  At one point in history, 
capital punishment fit the crime of theft, but today we no longer think 
death is proportionate to theft.  Ordinal proportionality is 
proportionality between cases, a question that can be framed as a 
question of equality, given that the relevant cases in the analysis must 
be similarly situated cases.  This fits the etymology of “proportion” well, 
since the word means “relative to a person’s share.”45  To determine 
which cases are similarly situated requires a description of the 
respective cases.  Which description covers which case is a question of 
the description’s extension.  A persuasive legal argument about 
proportionality in punishment that appeals to the etymology, history, 
 
 44 Cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (“The basic concept underlying the 
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”). 
 45 See Proportion, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/definition/proportion (last 
visited October 2020). 
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conception, and extension of proportionality allows that moral 
commitment to operate normatively on its own terms.  A shorter way to 
say this is to say that majestic legal reasoning about proportionality in 
punishment appeals to the intrinsic features of proportionality as a 
moral value. 
B.  The Features of Majestic Law 
Justice John Paul Stevens advanced the idea of majestic law on 
several occasions.  Five distinct features can be gleaned from his dissent 
in McDonald v. City of Chicago.46  A sixth appears in his dissent in Van 
Orden v. Perry.47   
In McDonald, the Court incorporated the Second Amendment into 
the Fourteenth Amendment and applied it to the states.48  In dissent, 
Justice Stevens examined substantive Due Process at length, on the 
ground that the incorporation of rights into Due Process and the 
evaluation of substantive Due Process rights are inextricable.49   
First, Justice Stevens adds to the stock of moral values on which not 
only Due Process but also majestic law draw.  Like Justice Warren in 
Miranda, Stevens cites dignity, personal integrity, and autonomy.50  He 
then adds respect, equality, freedom of conscience, and liberty in 
intimate relationships, concluding that “these are the central values we 
have found implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”51  Stevens also 
describes these moral commitments as a “conceptual core” of the liberty 
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.52  None of these moral 
commitments is confined to the Due Process Clause, however.  Moral 
commitments, each with its own etymology, history, conception, and 
extension, underwrite many doctrines, each embodied in its own legal 




 46 See McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 861–80 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 47 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 732 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 48 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750 (“Applying the standard that is well established in 
our case law, we hold that the Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the 
States.”). 
 49 Id. at 861 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“This is a substantive due process case.”).  
 50 Id. at 879–80 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984) (“the 
ability independently to define one’s identity”) and Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem’l Hosp., 523 
F.2d 716, 719 (1975) (“the individual’s right to make certain unusually important 
decisions that will affect his own, or his family’s, destiny”)).  
 51 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 880. 
 52 Id. at 879. 
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Second, Stevens warns against the reduction of these moral 
commitments to descriptive terms.   
A rigid historical methodology is unfaithful to the 
Constitution’s command.  For if it were really the case that 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of liberty embraces 
only those rights “so rooted in our history, tradition, and 
practice as to require special protection,” then the guarantee 
would serve little function, save to ratify those rights that state 
actors have already been according the most extensive 
protection.53 
Stevens describes this problem as a matter of faux “objectivity” and 
hidden “value judgments,” and cites Justice Harlan’s objection that some 
Due Process standards are circular.54  As we will see in the next Part and 
in Part V, however, the pathology of reducing moral commitments to 
descriptive terms is more fundamentally a feature of the flawed 
metaethics that underwrites the subjective stop.  For now, it must 
suffice to say that the reduction of moral commitments to descriptive 
terms is inconsistent with majestic law and legal reasoning, which 
engage moral values, norms, terms, explanations, and judgments on 
their own terms.   
Third, Justice Stevens writes that to fail to engage with the moral 
commitments we make in law and legal reasoning “effaces this Court’s 
distinctive role in saying what the law is, leaving the development and 
safekeeping of liberty to majoritarian political processes.  It is judicial 
abdication in the guise of judicial modesty.”55  If judges are required to 
reduce moral commitments to descriptive terms, then the judiciary’s 
role is reduced to tallying how many jurisdictions follow one contested 
rule instead of another, or to poring over legal texts as if they were 
scripture, or to acting as amateur historians.  This rush to the safe 
harbor of description goes beyond effacing the Court’s distinctive role, 
to depriving the Court of moral authority altogether. 
Fourth, Stevens expresses skepticism about “objectivity” as a virtue 
in legal reasoning.  “My point is simply that Justice Scalia’s defense of his 
method, which holds out objectivity and restraint as its cardinal—and, 
it seems, only—virtues, is unsatisfying on its own terms.  For a limitless 
number of subjective judgments may be smuggled into his historical 
analysis.  Worse, they may be buried in the analysis.”56  Justice Stevens 
 
 53 Id. at 875. 
 54 Cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 183 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting 
that to identify fundamental rights as those which are old, much praised, or found in the 
Bill of Rights is circular reasoning).  
 55 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 876 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 56 Id. at 908. 
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concedes too much here.  Skepticism about “objectivity” is warranted, 
but the best way to get at the central problem is not to search for hidden 
subjectivity, but to query “subjectivity” itself.  There is no easy 
objective/subjective dichotomy to be found in moral or legal reasoning.  
The best way to deal with deceptive pretenses to objectivity, or with the 
imposition of an obligation to achieve objectivity, is to deepen our 
understanding of what it means to say that our moral commitments, and 
our legal reasoning about them, are subjective.  To say they are 
subjective is not to say that they are irrational, arbitrary, prejudicial, 
mere intuitions, inarticulate emotional reactions, personal instead of 
public, or supernatural instead of empirical. 
Fifth, the enterprise of majestic law is more demanding of judges—
as it is for legislators, lawyers, and scholars—than maintaining a 
pretense of objectivity is.  Justice Stevens asks: “In considering such a 
majestic term as ‘liberty’ and applying it to present circumstances, how 
are we to do justice to its urgent call and its open texture—and to the 
grant of interpretive discretion the latter embodies—without injecting 
excessive subjectivity . . . ?”57  He answers that “we must ground the 
analysis in historical experience and reasoned judgment, and never on 
‘merely personal and private notions.’”58  Instead, he says, we should 
rely on the “guideposts” of constitutional terms’ moral commitments.59  
Here too, however, the issue needs reframing.  The challenge of majestic 
law is not to avoid subjective moral commitments.  It is, instead, to 
recognize that the subjectivity of these commitments does not imply 
that they are personal and private or in any other way unfit for legal 
reasoning. 
Finally, in Van Orden v. Perry, an Establishment Clause case, Justice 
Stevens had this to say about “personal preferences”: 
To reason from the broad principles contained in the 
Constitution does not, as Justice Scalia suggests, require us to 
abandon our heritage in favor of unprincipled expressions of 
personal preference.  The task of applying the broad 
principles that the Framers wrote into the text of the First 
Amendment is, in any event, no more a matter of personal 
preference than is one’s selection between two (or more) 
sides in a heated historical debate.  We serve our 
constitutional mandate by expounding the meaning of 
 
 57 Id. at 877. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id.at 878. 
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constitutional provisions with one eye toward our Nation’s 
history and the other fixed on its democratic aspirations.60 
This amounts to a rejection of the subjective stop.  It is a recognition that 
we debate moral questions in public life, and that courts and litigants do 
the same.  It is easy, however, to imagine someone’s arguing that 
choosing a side in a heated historical debate is itself a matter of personal 
preference.  What is missing from Justice Stevens’s argument, then, is a 
case against the idea that reasoning about moral commitments is 
identical to the unprincipled imposition of personal preferences.  To 
understand majestic law we need a deeper understanding of what 
Justice Stevens rejected.  This is the subject of Part IV, on the definition 
and features of the subjective stop. 
Before we proceed any further, however, one fundamental 
objection to majestic law must be addressed: the question of judicial 
activism. 
C.  Institutional Majestic Law 
If judges are released from the obligation not to decide cases based 
on unreduced moral commitments, then it seems that an essential 
constraint on judicial power has been removed.  If a finding that a right 
has been violated is a true finding of moral transgression, and if 
adjudicating moral transgressions is the business of courts, then 
majestic law is dangerous to the balance of power between the 
branches. 
This objection has no merit.  Majestic law does not entail overreach 
by the judiciary, because it does not entail judges’ imposing morality—
theirs or anyone else’s—on individuals or other institutional actors.  A 
moral commitment in majestic law has legal authority only if it has been 
positively enacted by a legislature or high court, formulated to comply 
with the rule of law, and subjected to institutional constraints such as 
the separation of powers and federalism.  For example, decency is a 
moral value, but it was not a feature of majestic law until it was adopted 
in Trop v. Dulles as part of the definition of “cruel and unusual 
punishment” under the Eighth Amendment.61  Trop did not reduce 
decency as a moral value to something descriptive, but it did convert 
decency as a moral value to decency as a legal norm.  Decency and its 
intrinsic features were incorporated into the Eighth Amendment by 
virtue of the Court’s positive authority over the Constitution.   
 
 60 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 732 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 61 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (“The [Eighth] Amendment must 
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.”). 
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This argument might seem formalistic.  If a moral commitment has 
been imposed by law, it is still a moral commitment.  It still imposes the 
morality of judges on people who might not share that commitment, 
especially if it is unreduced.  This objection overlooks existing 
constraints on the adoption of any normative commitment in law.  
Courts have no desire to call their independence from politics into 
question.  Courts are fully aware of the checks that the other branches 
of government can impose if they perceive judicial overreach, and of the 
impact on judicial authority when such checks are implemented.  
Federal courts have recognized the importance of comity with state 
courts, especially where one of the most contentious constitutional 
issues—the death penalty—is concerned, and Congress has reinforced 
the observance of federalism in habeas corpus legislation.62  It is 
unthinkable that a court would incorporate any moral commitment into 
law unless that commitment has broad, not to say unanimous, support 
in society at large.  The vision of heroic judicial activism is long dead.63 
  From this perspective, the idea of majestic law rules out only one 
set of arguments against judicial overreach: arguments to the effect that 
some contemplated judicial rationale is “subjective,” and therefore unfit 
for legal reasoning.  To bar this set of arguments is far from a license for 
judicial activism, given that every other reason not to engage in judicial 
activism remains in place.   
One judicial constraint is particularly important: simple prudence.  
In McDonald, Justice Stevens argued that owning a handgun is not 
“critical to leading a life of autonomy, dignity, or political equality.”64  
Justice Scalia replied, “Who says?”65  Scalia’s argument is a full subjective 
stop—a metaethical argument—in response to Stevens’s moral 
argument about the role of guns in a good life.  If we take away the 
subjective stop and imagine Scalia’s meeting Stevens on the ground of 
morality, the result is a debate on the Court about whether owning a gun 
contributes to autonomy, dignity, and equality.  Majestic law envisions 
this level of moral engagement in legal reasoning.  On the role of guns in 
a good life, however, one can fairly ask whether direct moral 
 
 62 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730–31 (1991) (reasoning in capital case 
that “the application of the independent and adequate state ground doctrine is grounded 
in concerns of comity and federalism.”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000) 
(purpose of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act  was “to further the 
principles of comity, finality, and federalism.”).  
 63 See Paul W. Kahn, Owen Fiss: Heroism in the Law, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 103, 108 
(2003) (reporting that, by 1979, “Fiss acknowledges that this heroic conception ‘expects 
a lot from judges—maybe too much.’”). 
 64 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 893. 
 65 Id. at 800.  
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engagement by the Court is wise.  Guns are powerful symbols of political 
identity in the United States, on the order of tribal totems.  Nothing in 
the argument for majestic law implies that the Court must dive into 
these dark waters.   
IV.  THE SUBJECTIVE STOP 
A.  Two Kinds of Subjective Stop 
Virtually everyone has encountered the subjective stop at some 
point.  In the course of a moral argument, one party will say something 
to the effect of, “It’s all subjective,” where “all” refers to moral values, 
norms, terms, explanations, and judgments generally.  This is said 
sometimes to propose a truce, and other times to achieve victory by fiat.  
In either case, the aim is to shut down debate.   
Defined more precisely, the term “subjective stop” refers to the use 
of “subjective”—or the pejorative use of similar terms such as “value 
judgment,” “opinion,” “intuition,” “emotional reaction,” “personal 
prejudice,” or “personal preference”—as a disqualification in legal 
reasoning.66  The term refers to either of two arguments that cut off or 
redirect legal analysis prematurely.  First, a person might raise the 
charge of subjectivity intending it to be a comprehensive 
counterargument sufficient to halt further debate without addressing 
the substance of the argument to which it responds, if that argument 
relies on a moral commitment.  I will refer to this kind of argument as a 
“full subjective stop.”  Second, a person might deploy the term 
“subjective” to impose a presumption that a moral commitment is not to 
be relied on in law unless its proponent can reduce the value to 
descriptive terms, such as a majority of jurisdictions’ following a 
particular rule, or plain text, or a record of the founders’ intent.  I will 
call this kind of argument, which is the more common of the two, a 
“presumptive subjective stop.”   
The most colorful deployment of the subjective stop is found in 
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Stanford v. Kentucky.  He begins 
the argument with a striking metaphor:  
 
 66  This Article offers no objection to the many other uses of the terms “objective” 
and “subjective” in law, particularly the use of the former to indicate a reasonable 
person, or the use of the latter standard to describe states of mind.  Cf. Wanatee v. Ault, 
259 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting that the district court’s application of an 
objective standard of reasonableness required a “subjective,” i.e., potentially arbitrary, 
judgment into what a reasonable person might want, so this reasonableness 
determination was avoided by a subjective inquiry into what Wanatee himself desired, 
as a matter of “objective” fact). 
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To say, as the dissent says, that “‘it is for us ultimately to judge 
whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the 
death penalty,’”—and to mean that as the dissent means it, i.e., 
that it is for us to judge, not on the basis of what we perceive 
the Eighth Amendment originally prohibited, or on the basis 
of what we perceive the society through its democratic 
processes now overwhelmingly disapproves, but on the basis 
of what we think “proportionate” and “measurably 
contributory to acceptable goals of punishment”—to say and 
mean that, is to replace judges of the law with a committee 
of philosopher-kings.67 
It is possible to read Justice Scalia’s reference to “philosopher-kings” in 
Stanford as merely a complaint that the dissenters had disregarded the 
applicable law and would have imposed a different set of rules because 
they preferred them.  Of course, the dissenters would not have done this.  
Perhaps Justice Scalia felt that the dissent’s interpretation of the 
applicable law was so far off the mark that hyperbole was called for.  If 
it is read this way, then “philosopher-kings” is a literary device.  If this 
were all it is, then there would be no reason to take it seriously. 
In context, however, the “philosopher-kings” charge has real 
content.  Near the end of his opinion, Justice Scalia makes his point much 
more precisely, using the metaethical “objective” versus “subjective” 
dichotomy, with the difference that he uses the equivalent term 
“personal preferences” to denote the latter.68 
While the dissent is correct that several of our cases have 
engaged in so-called “proportionality” analysis, examining 
whether “there is a disproportion ‘between the punishment 
imposed and the defendant’s blameworthiness,’” and whether 
a punishment makes any “measurable contribution to 
acceptable goals of punishment,” we have never invalidated a 
punishment on this basis alone.  All of our cases condemning 
a punishment under this mode of analysis also found that the 
objective indicators of state laws or jury determinations 
evidenced a societal consensus against that penalty.  In fact, 
the two methodologies blend into one another, since 
“proportionality” analysis itself can only be conducted on the 
 
 67 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379 (1989). 
 68 Cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 431 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[W]here, as here, 
the language of the applicable constitutional provision provides great leeway and where 
the underlying social policies are felt to be of vital importance, the temptation to 
read personal preference into the Constitution is understandably great.  It is too easy to 
propound our subjective standards of wise policy under the rubric of more or less 
universally held standards of decency.”). 
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basis of the standards set by our own society; the only 
alternative, once again, would be our personal preferences.69 
Three important points are buried in this quotation.  First, just as 
“philosopher-kings” is a pejorative term, so is the more familiar 
“personal preferences.”  For example, the Court has interpreted the 
word “personal” in a moral-evaluative context as a pejorative intensifier 
indicating idiosyncratic bias and prejudice.70  The word “preference” is 
the economist’s preferred term for any individual normative evaluation, 
be it animal desire, aesthetic critique, moral judgment, or religious 
conviction.71  Given the objectives of an appropriately modest economic 
analysis, this reduction is unobjectionable.  The difficulty arises when 
this reduction of moral value is perceived to be tautological, necessary, 
exhaustively descriptive, or all three.  In popular terms, this perception 
is expressed in the pejorative use of terms such as “subjective,” “value 
judgment,” “mere opinion,” “intuition,” “emotional reaction,” “personal 
prejudice,” or “personal preference.”   
Second, to say, as Justice Scalia does, that a judgment of 
proportionate punishment must include a survey of the legal standards 
employed by the states—to insist that proportionality and a survey of 
prevailing doctrine are methodologies that “blend into one another”—
is to subject a moral judgment to a subjective stop that can be overcome 
by data.  The underlying rationale for this demand is two-fold: first, that 
proportionate punishment is a moral question, any answer to which will 
invoke moral commitments; and second, that any moral commitment 
must be reduced to a description, on pain of its being deemed unfit for 
legal reasoning because it is a personal belief that is potentially 
irrational, arbitrary, or otherwise unfit for legal reasoning.  To impose 
this presumption is to assert a presumptive subjective stop.  That is, it is 
a refusal to allow proportionality to operate in legal reasoning on its 
own terms, as a moral commitment that carries its own normative 
weight in its etymology, history, conception, and extension. 
Third, to the extent that Justice Scalia does not blend the 
methodologies of proportionality analysis and surveys of state law, he 
subjects the former to a full subjective stop argument.  To say that “the 
only alternative [to a blended methodology] . . . would be our personal 
 
 69 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 379–80 (internal citations omitted). 
 70 See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 549–50 (1994) (“It is common to speak 
of ‘personal bias’ or ‘personal prejudice’ without meaning the adjective to do anything 
except emphasize the idiosyncratic nature of bias and prejudice.”). 
 71 See Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in 
Terry Stops in Street Policing, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 67 (2015) 
(“Revealed preferences reflect tastes or interests that the agent is pursuing through the 
use of her power.”).  
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preferences,” and unambiguously to dismiss this alternative is to deny 
these moral commitments any role in the determination of 
constitutional validity.  It is to reject a judgment about proportionality 
that relies on the intrinsic features of relevant moral commitments 
because these commitments are necessarily irrational, arbitrary, 
emotional, personal instead of public, prejudiced, or supernatural 
instead of empirical—or, in a word, subjective. 
B.  The Features of the Subjective Stop 
1.  A Hard Subjective/Objective Distinction 
Judges who employ either kind of subjective stop characteristically 
rely on a hard distinction between “subjective” and “objective” beliefs.  
Here, for example, is part of Justice Scalia’s response to Justice Stevens’s 
dissent in McDonald:   
Even though [Justice Stevens] does “not doubt for a moment 
that many Americans . . . see [firearms] as critical to their way 
of life as well as to their security,” he pronounces that owning 
a handgun is not “critical to leading a life of autonomy, dignity, 
or political equality.” Who says? Deciding what is essential to 
an enlightened, liberty-filled life is an inherently political, 
moral judgment—the antithesis of an objective approach that 
reaches conclusions by applying neutral rules to verifiable 
evidence.72 
Under the logic of the subjective stop, the antithesis of objectivity is 
subjectivity, marked by the exercise of moral judgment, and it is evident 
that Justice Scalia regards moral commitments to autonomy, dignity, 
equality, and the like to be subjective in a pejorative sense.  These moral 
commitments must be renounced in favor of “neutral rules” and 
“verifiable evidence.”  In other words, Justice Scalia imposes a full 
subjective stop. 
As we will see below, in Section V.A., Justice Scalia’s insistence that 
“verifiable evidence” is required for rational belief, and his apparent 
assumption that moral commitments cannot meet this requirement, are 
the products of a notorious failure in subjectivist metaethical theory.  As 
for his insistence on “neutral rules,” it is difficult to see how any legal 
rule can be value neutral.  Norms necessarily advance one valued end in 
preference to others.  Legal norms characteristically advance or balk 
competing moral commitments, notably in law’s aspirations to fairness 
instead of unfairness, and justice instead of injustice. 
 
 
 72 McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 799–800 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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Not only are moral commitments said to be unverifiable and 
divorced from fact but they are also said to be irrational, in the root 
sense of not stating reasons.  Justice Rehnquist wrote, dissenting in 
Woodson v. North Carolina, that, “[i]n Georgia juries are entitled to 
return a sentence of life, rather than death, for no reason whatever, 
simply based upon their own subjective notions of what is right and 
what is wrong.”73  Again, we will see that this is mistaken.  Under an 
adequate subjectivist metaethics, morality gives reasons.  To invoke 
“subjective” moral commitments to justify a discretionary choice in law, 
such as death sentencing, is not to act irrationally or arbitrarily.  If the 
exercise of discretion were “subjective” in that pejorative sense, then 
any discretionary judgment that required some moral evaluation—such 
as fair versus unfair—would always be unjust. 
Finally, the hard subjective/objective distinction has turned up in 
the form of a hard distinction between “subjective value judgments” and 
law itself:  
The question whether an alien’s relatives are likely to suffer 
an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship upon the 
alien’s removal is a discretionary decision because it is “‘a 
subjective question’ that depends on the value judgment ‘of 
the person or entity examining the issue,’” not a legal 
determination.74  
To say that law is or ought to be divorced from value judgments because 
value judgments are subjective is mistaken because the Ninth Circuit’s 
conception of these judgments—as irrational, arbitrary, personal, 
emotional, intuitive, or supernatural—is false under any adequate 
subjectivist metaethics.  More fundamentally, the idea that law can be 
severed from morality is absurd.  Even hard legal positivism holds only 
that the validity and normativity of law do not depend on its moral 
merits.75  Positive law serves moral ends.  
2.  Metaethical Traps and Strawmen 
Those who defend majestic law have frequently undercut their 
own position with careless language that leaves it vulnerable to the 
subjective stop.  Metaethics is the subject of the next Part, but a brief, 
high-altitude overview of the field of metaethics is helpful on this point.  
Most theories in metaethics can be described by a kind of triangulation.  
Such theories are realist or anti-realist, naturalistic or non-naturalistic, 
 
 73 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 314–15 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting).  
 74 De Mercado v. Mukasey, 566 F.3d 810, 814 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 75 See Scott Shapiro, On Hart’s Way Out, 4 LEGAL THEORY 469, 478–79 (1998). 
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and cognitivist or non-cognitivist.  The gist of realism is that morality 
exists independently from us.76  Both of the theories used to debunk the 
subjective stop in this Article are subjectivist theories that make 
morality dependent on us by definition; so, both are necessarily anti-
realist.  By the same token, these subjectivist theories are naturalistic.  If 
morality rests in any way on human beings’ subjective reactions to 
events, then morality is premised on nature, and not on supernatural 
forces such as a deity or any other reason apart from nature, as Kant, for 
example, understood morality.77  Finally, these subjectivist theories are 
ordinarily classified as non-cognitivist theories because they hold that 
morality is an expression of emotion or values that we project onto the 
world.78  
From this perspective, the polar opposite of a subjectivist 
metaethics is a realist, non-naturalist, and cognitivist theory.79  For 
example, at the turn of the twentieth century, G.E. Moore advanced the 
theory that moral qualities are real entities that transcend the natural 
world and that we have access to these qualities through intuition.80  
From a present-day perspective, this theory is fanciful—which makes it 
an ideal strawman metaethics to attribute to majestic law: 
The next constraint Justice Stevens suggests is harder to 
evaluate.  He describes as “an important tool for guiding 
judicial discretion” “sensitivity to the interaction between the 
intrinsic aspects of liberty and the practical realities of 
contemporary society.”  I cannot say whether that sensitivity 
will really guide judges because I have no idea what it is.  Is it 
some sixth sense instilled in judges when they ascend to the 
 
 76 See RUSS SHAFER-LANDAU, MORAL REALISM: A DEFENCE 2 (2003) (“Moral realism is the 
theory that moral judgements enjoy a special sort of objectivity: such judgements, when 
true, are so independently of what any human being anywhere, in any circumstances 
whatever, thinks of them.”). 
 77 See Ernest Weinrib, Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 472, 486–
87 (1987) (“Practical reason is the determining ground that can conform free choice to 
its own nature as a spontaneous causality of concepts.  This meshing of freedom and 
necessity imparts normative force—and thus practical reality—to the entire idea of 
reason.”).  
 78 See ALEXANDER MILLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY METAETHICS 53, 95 (Polity 
Press ed., 2003).  This point is open to debate.  Simon Blackburn resisted calling 
projectivism a non-cognitivist theory.  BLACKBURN, supra note 14 at 54.  Allan Gibbard 
describes his norm expressivism as a non-cognitivist theory “in the narrow sense that, 
according to it, to call a thing rational is not to state a matter of fact, either truly or 
falsely.”  GIBBARD, supra note 12, at 8.  
 79 Cf. MILLER, supra note 78, at 8 (flow chart of metaethical theories identifying the 
positions of Moore, Ayer, Gibbard, Blackburn et al.). 
 80 See Panayat Butchvarov, Ethics Dehumanized, in METAETHICS AFTER MOORE 367, 
368–70 (Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons eds.) (describing the intuitionist and non-
naturalistic features of Moore’s metaethics). 
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bench?  Or does it mean judges are more constrained when 
they agonize about the cosmic conflict between liberty and its 
potentially harmful consequences?81 
In fact, liberty has intrinsic qualities that have nothing to do with a 
“cosmic conflict” perceived by a “sixth sense.”  This dismissive 
description fits Moore’s moral realism, which is not the metaethics of 
majestic law.  The intrinsic qualities of moral commitments are inferred 
from their etymology, history, conception, and extension—all of which 
are features of the natural world.  As explained above, with regard to the 
Eighth Amendment’s “evolving standards of decency” standard, these 
features give decency and other moral commitments entirely natural 
and cognitively available substance that is eminently suited to legal 
reasoning.   
Justice Scalia’s point may be nothing more than hyperbole, but this 
is no reason to walk into a metaethical trap.  Non-naturalistic 
metaethical theories are vulnerable to the charge that they fail to explain 
how natural beings can perceive, or speak intelligibly about, a realm of 
morals or such “queer entities” as moral concepts.82  One way to 
describe a unique moral realm or body of moral entities is to say it 
transcends nature.  So, it is decidedly unhelpful to use transcendental 
rhetoric in majestic legal reasoning, as Justice Brennan did in in Speiser 
v. Randall: 
There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing 
error in factfinding, which both parties must take into 
account.  Where one party has at stake an interest of 
transcending value—as a criminal defendant his liberty—this 
margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing 
on the other party the burden . . . of persuading the fact-finder 
at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.’83  
 
 81 McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 796 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 82 John Mackie argued that moral statements are always false because they 
presuppose “queer entities,” which are “entities or qualities or relations of a very 
strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe,” and that “if we were 
aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or 
intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else.”  JOHN 
MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 26–27 (1977). 
 83 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525–26 (1958); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial 
and in its more transcendent dimensions.”); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 
(1960) (“As important as it is that persons who have committed crimes be convicted, 
there are considerations which transcend the question of guilt or innocence.”). 
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Justice Brennan may have used “transcending value” as a rhetorical 
flourish.  If so, however, he weakened the substantive argument that 
justice places the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on 
the prosecution.  It is all too easy to paint non-natural qualities as being 
unsuited to legal reasoning and to impose the subjective stop for that 
reason.84 
The cause of majestic law is also undermined by careless 
noncognitivism.  In Haley v. Ohio, for example, Justice Frankfurter 
described moral commitments not just as “feelings” but as “deep 
inarticulate feelings.” 
This Court must give the freest possible scope to States in the 
choice of their methods of criminal procedure. But these 
procedures cannot include methods that may fairly be 
deemed to be in conflict with deeply rooted feelings of the 
community.  Of course this is a most difficult test to apply, but 
apply it we must, warily, and from case to case.85 
* * * 
[W]hether a confession of a lad of fifteen is ‘voluntary’ and as 
such admissible, or ‘coerced’ and thus wanting in due process, 
is not a matter of mathematical determination.  Essentially it 
invites psychological judgment—a psychological judgment 
that reflects deep, even if inarticulate, feelings of our society.  
Judges must divine that feeling as best they can from all the 
relevant evidence and light which they can bring to bear for a 
confident judgment of such an issue, and with every endeavor 
to detach themselves from their merely private views.86 
If the moral commitments of society and the Constitution were nothing 
more than feelings, then “the humble exercise of judicial judgment” 
might well recommend reducing these commitments to the more 
“objective” terms of revealed preferences.  As it is, however, no such 
reduction is necessary, because emotions are not feelings. 
To describe moral commitments in terms of feelings instead of 
emotions radically understates the rationality of emotions and, as a 
result, overstates the non-cognitivism of subjectivist metaethics.  
Feelings are indeed “inarticulate,” as Justice Frankfurter says, but in this 
respect they are distinguishable from emotions.  A feeling is a somatic 
state, such as being hot or cold, whereas an emotion, such as love, has 
 
 84 See, e.g., Schlumberger Techs., Inc. v. Wiley, 113 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(“Nonetheless, we reversed because the district court may not disqualify an attorney on 
the basis of some ‘transcendental code of conduct . . . that . . . existed only in 
the subjective opinion of the court, of which [the attorney] had no notice . . . .’”). 
 85 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 604 (1948). 
 86 Id. at 603. 
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meaning.  An emotion can have an object—”I love her”—whereas a 
feeling cannot.  It makes no sense to say, “I am hot her,” or “I am cold 
floor.”  We also predicate things of emotion—”I am distraught that she 
loves another”—but not of feelings.  To say, “I am hot that this seat is 
taken,” or “I am cold that this painting is blue,” might have metaphorical 
sense, but neither has literal sense.  Finally, emotions are fallible, 
whereas feelings are not.  It makes sense to say, “I thought I loved her, 
but I realize now I was merely infatuated.”  It does not make sense to 
say, “I thought I was cold, but I realize now I was hot.”  If I feel cold when 
my body temperature is 103 degrees, then I feel cold.  My high 
temperature does not describe my feelings at the time.  This is a medical 
paradox, not a genuine mistake. 
Justice Frankfurter ought to have referred to “deeply rooted 
emotions of the community” and “the deep emotions of our society.”  
The practice and defense of majestic law requires more than this, but to 
acknowledge that emotions are meaningful is an essential starting point. 
3.  Naive Reductivism 
Those who object to majestic law insist that moral commitments 
cannot be relied upon in legal reasoning, as Justice Neil Gorsuch does 
here.  
[J]udges should . . . strive (if humanly and so imperfectly) to 
apply the law as it is, focusing backward, not forward, and 
looking to text, structure, and history to decide what a 
reasonable reader at the time of the events in question would 
have understood the law to be—not to decide cases based on 
their own moral convictions or the policy consequences they 
believe might serve society best.87  
For the most part, this is an admirably plain statement of a useful 
institutional principle.  Judges should not decide cases “based on their 
own moral convictions,” as opposed to the moral commitments of the 
law itself.  Sometimes, however, the exclusion of morality from legal 
reasoning is bolstered by a metaethical claim.  For example, in his 
dissent in Hannah v. Larche, in which the Court held that neither Due 
Process nor the Confrontation Clause was violated by a federal Civil 
Rights Commission that refused to disclose the identities of 
complainants, Justice Douglas condemned a conception of the Due 
Process Clauses that makes the guarantee dependent on “the subjective 
or even whimsical notions of a majority of this Court,” and “visceral 
 
 87 Neil M. Gorsuch, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the Legacy of 
Justice Scalia, 2016 Sumner Canary Lecture at Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 906 (2016). 
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reactions” concerning  “what is fair, decent, or reasonable.”88  This is, 
specifically, a metaethics of emotivism, holding that moral 
commitments—fairness, decency, reasonableness—are expressions of 
emotion.  If emotion is non-cognitive—the point of comparing it to a 
state of the viscera—then it follows that moral commitments are 
irrational, intuitive, arbitrary, and otherwise unsuitable for legal 
reasoning.   
There must be more to Justice Douglas’s metaethical point than 
this, however, given that he plainly does not mean to say that fairness or 
decency—or justice itself, presumably—is entirely out of bounds in 
legal reasoning.  One way to solve this riddle is to look more closely at 
Justice Gorsuch’s point about the institutional limits on the use of moral 
commitments in legal reasoning.  We can ask why he contrasts moral 
conviction to the apparently permissible considerations of text, 
structure, history, and original understanding.  These things are 
descriptive, and so are admirably free of the “subjectivity” of fairness, 
decency, and reasonableness.  By the same token, however, these 
descriptions are not prescriptive—to state an obvious but oddly 
unacknowledged point—and their standing relative to law’s 
normativity is unclear.  
One way to describe Gorsuch’s point is that law should be 
interpreted in light of facts such as legal structure, history, and historical 
understanding.  The problem is that legal interpretation has normative 
effects.  Depending on the prevailing interpretation, a case will come out 
one way instead of another.  The oughts or obligations of the applicable 
rule for which that case is taken as precedent also will come out one way 
or another, depending on interpretation.  And the moral values at issue 
in any given legal interpretation are the same moral values that are 
expressed in the law being interpreted—values such as fairness, 
decency, and justice—which means that legal interpretation must be 
just as infected with the “subjectivity” of moral commitments as the 
direct invocation of moral commitments is supposed to be.  It makes no 
difference to the “subjectivity” of law’s moral commitments that their 
interpretation is done by the light of text, structure, history, or original 
understanding.  
As an alternative, perhaps Gorsuch’s point is that text, structure, 
history, and original understanding are evidence of the law.  The idea of 
law as evidence is ambiguous, however.  It might refer to a description 
of the information found in a law library—which might be evidence in a 
lawsuit against a rogue librarian, for example.  Alternatively, law as 
 
 88 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 505 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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evidence might refer to law as precedent—that is, to the normative use 
of legal information.  There can be no doubt that the notion of law as 
evidence is invoked in the subjective stop for normative, not descriptive, 
purposes.  Even so, the ambiguity itself is instructive.  Merely to describe 
the evidence of text, history, or original understanding might work fine 
as evidence in a trial of a librarian, but it is not sufficient to give these 
things normative significance.  For this, the evidence must be 
interpreted in order to bring out its relevance to fairness, justice, and so 
on.  Otherwise, law could not advance beyond a static body of precedent 
applied by rote.  Again, however, these interpretations must be just as 
infected with the “subjectivity” of moral commitments as the direct 
invocation of moral commitments is supposed to be.   
For example, in order to cope with the supposedly fatal subjectivity 
of the “evolving standards of decency” standard in Eighth Amendment 
proportionality analysis, the Court has turned to lengthy accounts of 
existing practices in punishment in the legislatures and jury rooms of 
the several states.89  These descriptive tallies of law are said to be 
evidence for the Court’s judgment about the punishment at issue, under 
the test of decency.90  This evidence is relevant to the Court’s 
independent determination, however, only if one assumes that it is 
evidence of what the people of the respective states consider a decent 
punishment to be.  In other words, the tally is a description of a moral 
commitment to decency in punishment, not an alternative to that moral 
commitment, nor an escape from the challenge of living up to it.  Polling 
a community’s judgments of decency is no escape from the “subjectivity” 
of decency as a moral commitment if judgments of decency are held 
“subjectively” by the community.  
There is a third way to understand the invocation of text, original 
intent, and so on, in presumptive subjective stop arguments.  Justices 
Douglas and Scalia and other proponents of the subjective stop seem to 
want to liberate law from the “subjectivity” of morality by making law 
descriptive while retaining its normativity.  The idea seems to be that all 
we wish to say about justice, for example, can be said in terms of legal 
facts instead.  This describes a reduction of moral commitments to 
descriptive properties.  Speaking broadly, a reduction is a translation, in 
which the essential properties of the thing reduced are carried over into 
 
 89 See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62 (2010); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 
407, 423–31 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564–68 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304, 312–17 (2002). 
 90 See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 426 (“The evidence of a national consensus with 
respect to the death penalty for child rapists, as with respect to juveniles, mentally 
retarded offenders, and vicarious felony murderers, shows divided opinion but, on 
balance, an opinion against it.”). 
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the thing it is reduced to, leaving behind the inessentials. 91  Where the 
subjective stop is concerned, the idea is that a reduction of our moral 
commitments into descriptions of original intent, the meaning of a text, 
or a tally of jurisdictions carries the normativity of our moral 
commitments over into these descriptions, leaving the subjectivity of 
morality behind.   
The first question about the reductive strategy is: what kind of 
reduction is this supposed to be?  Some reductions are ontological; that 
is, they are about what exists.  This is a strong “nothing but” claim, as in 
the general proposition that biology is reducible to physics.92  A theory 
reduction is different from this.  A theory reduction can be explanatory, 
claiming that a reduced theory can be inferred from another, reducing, 
theory—for example, that biological science can be inferred from the 
science of physics.93  Or a theory reduction can be a matter of 
replacement—a claim that a description in the reducing terms is more 
accurate or complete than a description in the reduced terms.  For 
example, genetic inheritance can be explained in terms of Mendel’s laws 
of inheritance, but DNA analysis explains not only observable inherited 
traits but also their molecular structure and chemical functioning.94   
Subjective stop arguments seem to assert a “nothing but” kind of 
reduction.  In the famous “philosopher-kings” passage from Stanford v. 
Kentucky, Justice Scalia argued that a tally of states’ relevant doctrines 
determines proportionate punishment on its own.  “‘[P]roportionality’ 
analysis itself can only be conducted on the basis of the standards set by 
our own society; the only alternative, once again, would be 
our personal preferences.”95  This seems to mean that any independent 
assessment of moral proportionality by the Court is obviated by the 
reduction to a tally of jurisdictions because no explanatory or normative 
 
 91 See Raphael van Reil & Robert van Gluck, Scientific Reduction, in STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. 9–11 (Spring 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr
2019/entries/scientific-reduction (“Saying that x reduces to y typically implies that x is 
nothing more than y or nothing over and above y.”). 
 92 See Ingo Brigant & Alan Love, Reductionism in Biology, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHIL. 3 (Spring 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/reduction-
biology (“Ontological reduction is the idea that each particular biological system (e.g., an 
organism) is constituted by nothing but molecules and their interactions.”). 
 93 See id. at 16 (“[T]heory reduction as deduction from theoretical principles is an 
instance of explanation.”).   
 94 See id. at 5–6 (“Over the past four decades, discussion has concentrated primarily 
on the question of whether classical genetics can be reduced to molecular genetics and 
biochemistry.”); see also van Reil & van Gluck, supra note 91, at 10–11 (“The main idea 
of diachronic reduction is . . . the replacement of one theory by another theory, such that 
one theory (the reducing one) becomes the successor of the reduced theory.”).  
 95 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379–80 (1989). 
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value in the moral commitment taken on its own terms survives the 
reduction.  In McDonald, similarly, Justice Scalia insisted that the moral 
commitments at the heart of Due Process must be reduced to 
expressions of popular will in legislation. 
Courts, [Justice Stevens] proclaims, must “do justice to [the 
Clause’s] urgent call and its open texture” by exercising the 
“interpretive discretion the latter embodies.”  (Why the 
people are not up to the task of deciding what new rights to 
protect, even though it is they who are authorized to make 
changes, see U.S. Const., Art. V, is never explained.)  And it 
would be “judicial abdication” for a judge to “tur[n] his back” 
on his task of determining what the Fourteenth Amendment 
covers by “outsourc[ing]” the job to “historical 
sentiment,”—that is, by being guided by what the American 
people throughout our history have thought.96  
To be guided by what the American people throughout our history have 
thought purportedly leaves no surviving value that might require the 
Court’s independent moral evaluation of Due Process under standards 
such as “essential to free government” and “to the maintenance of 
democratic institutions,”97 “a fair and enlightened system of justice,” 98 
“immutable principles of justice, which inhere in the very idea of free 
government,”99 or  “immunities . . . implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.”100   
We have no reason to believe that the descriptive-prescriptive 
divide can be jumped this easily.  A purported reduction of the moral 
commitments of law to “nothing but” the descriptive features of 
legislation, or text, or historical intent is implausible.  It is radically 
unlike a reduction of a body to molecules.  We cannot say that 
legislation, or text, or original intent is constitutive of law’s moral 
commitments as molecules are constitutive of a body.  It does not help 
matters to read the subjective stop as an explanatory theory reduction.  
Our moral commitments cannot be inferred from legislation in the way 
that biology can be inferred from physics.  The subjective stop most 
resembles theory reduction as a matter of replacement.  It claims that a 
description in the reducing terms (legislation) is more accurate or 
complete than a description in the reduced terms (moral commitments) 
so that the former should supersede the latter.  Any such reduction, 
 
 96 McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 793–94 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 97 Id. at 794, 874–75. 
 98 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 99 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932) (citing Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 
389 (1989)). 
 100 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (citing Palko, 302 U.S. at 324–25). 
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however, leaves the explanatory value of the reduced properties 
intact.101  The reduction of evolving standards of decency to state by 
state tallies of existing doctrine, even if possible and enlightening, does 
not imply that there is no such thing as decency or that judges cannot 
invoke decency in its unreduced form, despite its subjectivity.  
V.  MODERN SUBJECTIVIST METAETHICS 
By now, it should be apparent that majestic law needs a metaethics 
sufficient to overcome the attractions of the subjective stop.  Modern 
subjectivist metaethics is ideal because it undermines the assumptions 
of the crude subjectivist metaethics on which the subjective stop 
depends.  Under each of two such theories discussed in this Part, we 
express subjective moral commitments in a rational, empirical way.  
First, however, it is important to understand the metaethics of the 
subjective stop itself. 
A.  Caveman Emotivism  
Justice Douglas’s Hannah v. Larche dissent, quoted in an epigraph 
at the outset, contains an instance of the subjective stop, but it is also a 
clear statement of the metaethics on which the subjective stop depends.  
Douglas thought the majority’s analysis made Due Process “reflect 
the subjective or even whimsical notions of a majority of this Court,” and 
that it left the law vulnerable to “visceral reactions in deciding what is 
fair, decent, or reasonable.”102  He thought the majority’s view could not 
be rationalized “on cold logic or reason,” and that “emotion rather than 
reason dictates the answer.”103  He found this subjectivity disqualifying 
in legal reasoning. 
The canonical statement of Douglas’s apparent premise is found in 
A.J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic, which was first published in 1936, 
with a second edition containing major emendations published in 1946.  
Ayer argued that fundamental ethical concepts are irreducible to 
empirical concepts; that their truth is not established by logic alone; that 
there are no criteria by which their validity can be judged; and that they 
are, for these reasons, meaningless “pseudo-concepts”104 that are 
“neither true nor false.”105  
 
 101 See RAILTON, supra note 10 at 16–17 (in natural and social scientific reduction, 
reduced properties retain their explanatory value). 
 102 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 505 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 103 Id. at 506. 
 104 See AYER, supra note 11, at 107. 
 105 Id. at 103. 
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It is if I had written “Stealing money!!”—where the shape and 
thickness of the exclamation points show, by a suitable 
convention, that a special sort of moral disapproval is the 
feeling which is being expressed.  It is clear that there is 
nothing here which can be true or false. . . .  For in saying that 
a certain type of action is right or wrong, I am not making any 
factual statement, not even a statement about my own state of 
mind.  I am merely expressing certain moral sentiments.106 
Ayer describes his position as “radically subjectivist”107 and a “radical 
empiricist thesis.”108  It is ordinarily referred to as “emotivism.”109   
In his Hannah dissent, Justice Douglas expresses a preference for 
judging according to “cold logic or reason.”  If we imagine Douglas and 
Ayer in conversation, Ayer would correct Douglas’s contrast between 
emotion on one hand and “logic or reason” on the other, where moral 
norms and judgments are concerned.  Ayer would insist that values are 
no more the product of logic than they are matters of fact.  The truths of 
logic are meaningful and true by virtue of being tautologies, or so Ayer 
argued, and this is manifestly not true of morality.110  Second, the same 
is true of “reason.”  Ayer was an empiricist, and as such he rejected 
rationalism—the view that the world can be reconstructed by reasoning 
from elemental ideas, as Plato, Descartes, and Berkeley believed.111  He 
also rejected Kant’s view that morality is the product of reason alone.112  
There is no doubt Douglas would agree with both of these points, but 
this raises the question of how he might have revised his dissent by 
contrasting emotion with something other than “cold logic or reason.”   
The obvious answer to this question is that Douglas could have 
made his point by contrasting emotion with facts (and happily would 
have done so if Ayer had been there to suggest it).  Empiricists are 
naturalists, holding the view that genuine knowledge is gained only by 
experience of the natural world.  As an empiricist, Ayer was strongly 
influenced by the Vienna School of logical positivists, and while he 
disagreed with that school of thought in some respects, he shared their 
basic view of meaning and truth.113  Ayer argued that a statement is 
meaningful, and thereby truth apt—capable of being true or false—if 
 
 106 Id. at 107. 
 107 Id. at 109. 
 108 Id. at 102. 
 109 See MILLER, supra note 78, at 26 (“Ayer’s version of emotivism is the simplest and 
most provocative version of non-cognitivism. . . .”). 
 110 AYER, supra note 11, at 84–85. 
 111 Id. at 73, 134–35. 
 112 Id. at 113. 
 113 See id. at 135–38. 
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and only if it falls within one of two categories.114  One of these 
categories consists of analytic statements (those that are true by virtue 
of being a tautology).115  Second, a statement can be meaningful by 
virtue of being verifiable; it is either an observation statement or a 
combination of observation statements.116  Ayer’s emotivism is a trivial 
implication of his positivism, under which meaning is limited to formal 
implications and observation statements, because moral statements are 
neither one.  As he says of moral statements in the passage quoted 
above, “there is nothing here that can be true or false,” because moral 
statements are not verifiable.  
Ayer’s emotivism is no longer persuasive, however, and never 
really was.  His metaethics was easily refuted.  If we think of moral 
evaluations as assertions, then the “hooray” and “boo” conception of 
moral evaluation seems plausible.  Suppose, however, that a moral 
evaluation appears in a more complex grammatical and logical 
structure, such as a subjunctive conditional: “If it were wrong for A to 
rob a bank, then it would be wrong for B to rob a bank.”  The moral 
content of the “wrong . . . to rob a bank” language in each clause is the 
same as the simple assertion that “it is wrong to rob a bank,” which 
Ayer’s emotivism renders as “Boo robbing banks!”  But in the context of 
a subjunctive conditional, this moral content clearly is meaningful.  
Suppose we say, “If it were so that ‘Boo A robs a bank,’ then it would be 
so that ‘Boo B robs a bank.’”  This implies a meaningful moral evaluation 
of robbing banks.  Otherwise, the point of the conditional would be to 
describe a similarity between A and B, whereas it is clear that we are at 
least as likely to be saying something about robbing banks as we are to 
be saying something about bank robbers.117  
By the time Ayer published the second edition of his book in 1946, 
he was aware of this defect.  He acknowledged that his definition of 
meaning in terms of his verificationism was too narrow.118  Accordingly, 
he acknowledged that his verificationism did not support emotivism. 
 
 114 Id. at 41. 
 115 AYER, supra note 11, at 79. 
 116 Id. at 13.   
 117 This is known as the Frege-Geach problem, after Peter Geach, who stated the 
problem and who attributed the insight to Gottlob Frege.  See MILLER, supra note 78, 
at 40–42. 
 118 See AYER, supra note 11, at 15 (“In putting forward the principle of verification as 
a criterion of meaning, I do not overlook the fact that the word ‘meaning’ is commonly 
used in a variety of senses, and I do not wish to deny that in some of these senses a 
statement may properly be said to be meaningful even though it is neither analytic nor 
empirically verifiable.”). 
HUIGENS (DO NOT DELETE) 1/7/2021  10:56 AM 
706 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:669 
The emotive theory of values, which is developed in the sixth 
chapter of this book, has provoked a fair amount of criticism; 
but I find that this criticism has been directed more often 
against the positivistic principles on which the theory has 
been assumed to depend than against the theory itself.119 
Ayer did not, however, offer any new arguments in favor of emotivism 
in the second edition of Language, Truth and Logic, or subsequently.120  
Ayer’s emotivism has virtually no adherents in the field of metaethics 
today.  In fact, his theory has been characterized as “‘cave man’ 
expressivism.”121  If the subjective stop depends on verificationist 
emotivism, then the subjective stop should be abandoned along with its 
philosophical premise. 
B.  Norm Expressivism 
Ayer’s failure was by no means the end of subjectivist metaethics, 
but later subjectivist theories do not support the subjective stop.  Allan 
Gibbard’s metaethics, which he calls “norm-expressivism,” agrees that 
our moral judgments are expressions of emotion, but his theory is part 
of a larger account of rationality.122  He describes rationality in terms of 
a particular understanding of normativity.123  “[T]o call something 
rational is to express one’s acceptance of norms that permit it.”124  
Where moral norms and judgments are concerned, this acceptance 
follows from a judgment about what it makes sense to do, think, and 
feel.125  One implication of this view of rationality and normativity is that 
when a person calls something rational, she does not describe her 
beliefs about isolated acts, norms, and judgments.  Instead, she 
expresses a judgment about whether it makes sense—broadly, in more 
than a pragmatic sense—to do an act, to require an act, or to evaluate an 
 
 119 Id. at 20.  The phrase “assumed to depend” in this sentence is disingenuous.  Ayer 
could not have made the dependence clearer. 
 120 Instead, he referred the reader to a new book, Ethics and Language, by the 
American emotivist Charles L. Stevenson.  Id. at 20 n.3; cf. CHARLES L. STEVENSON, ETHICS 
AND LANGUAGE (1944).  In fact, “emotive meaning” is a central concept in Ethics and 
Language.  See id. at 33. 
 121 Michael Ridge, Ecumenical Expressivism: The Best of Both Worlds?, 2 OXFORD 
STUDIES IN METAETHICS 59 (2007). 
 122 See GIBBARD, supra note 12, at 8.  Gibbard opts for the term “expressivism” in part 
because he quite reasonably views the term “subjectivist” as a pejorative.  See id. at 153.  
I will discuss his theory in his preferred terms of “expressivism” and “expressivist” but 
with the understanding that Gibbard’s theory is, as I have framed my thesis, a 
“subjectivist” theory. 
 123 See id. at 7–8.   
 124 Id. at 7. 
 125 See id. at 8 (“We experience our lives in normative terms, in terms of things it 
makes sense to do, to think, and to feel.”). 
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act in a particular way under some normative system.126  Accordingly, 
“moral judgments consist in the acceptance of norms to govern moral 
emotions.”127   
The question of what it makes sense to feel presumes that emotions 
are rational.  One might think that an emotion can be rational only to the 
extent that the beliefs supporting the emotion are rational.128  It is 
rational to feel angry only if I believe I have suffered some wrong.  It is 
rational to feel guilty only if I believe I have done wrong to someone else.  
It is not unheard of, however, for someone to know that she has not been 
wronged, but to feel that she has been wronged.  The challenge is to 
explain how this error is a rational error. 
Suppose an employee who has been passed over for a promotion 
feels angry with her employer for that reason, even though she knows 
that the prevailing candidate was better qualified.  She might be angry 
because she considers her employer a friend, even though she has no 
right to expect favoritism at work and knows it.  We might say “It makes 
sense that she is angry,” if we were willing to tolerate her failure to live 
up to her beliefs.  To say “It makes sense for her to be angry,” however, 
would be to endorse her failure.  The difference between the two 
statements is that to say the latter is to say something about the norms 
for anger.  In the case of the passed-over employee, we would say that it 
does not make sense for her to be angry.  Otherwise, we would make the 
same mistake under the norms for anger that the angry employee has 
made. 
This points toward Gibbard’s central argument.  To hold an act to 
be rational is to accept a system of norms under which that act is 
rational.129  Because Gibbard’s norm-expressivist metaethics premises 
morality on emotions, this formulation extends to systems of both 
emotional norms and moral norms.130  Indeed, “[m]orality consists in 
norms for moral sentiments.”131  If (as seems likely) the employee 
accepts a moral system under which a decision is unfair only if it is 
arbitrary, the product of discrimination or favoritism, or similarly 
defective, then her feeling that she has been treated unfairly is 
emotionally and morally irrational.  She is, in a word, wrong. 
 
 
 126 See id. at 6–8. 
 127 Id. at 129. 
 128 GIBBARD, supra note 12, at 39. 
 129 Id. at 92, 153. 
 130 See id. at 128. 
 131 Id. at 277; see also id. at 293. 
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Suppose, however, that the employee’s idea of being treated 
unfairly does not turn on things such as arbitrariness, favoritism, or 
prejudice.  Like a small child, she accepts a system of emotional and 
moral norms that designates as “unfair” anything that thwarts her 
desires.  If this is so, then, on the analysis done so far, she is emotionally 
and morally rational in feeling that she has been treated unfairly.  It 
follows from a system of norms, albeit a childish one, that she actually 
subscribes to.  Norm expressivism seems to imply that she has indeed 
been treated unfairly because this assessment is rational under the 
system of norms she accepts.  This is clearly a mistake, so Gibbard’s 
norm expressivism needs some way to explain why and how this 
childish employee’s emotional and moral evaluations are wrong.   
Moral realism—which describes morality in “objective” terms, as 
existing apart from what we believe and what we do—could solve this 
problem, but norm expressivism does not appeal to that kind of 
objectivity.132  Norm expressivism does not tell us how to locate moral 
truth.  Instead, it holds that “[n]ormative judgment mimics the search 
for truth,”133 and that it does so in a way that provides enough 
“objectivity” to allow us to say that the childish employee is morally 
irrational and wrong for that reason.134   
What kind of objectivity is this, if not the objectivity of moral 
realism, and how does it help us with the problem of the childish 
employee?  Note that Gibbard’s theory is naturalistic.  Systems of norms 
exist in society, as patterns of conduct and demands for reasons for 
conduct, in a wide variety.135  If we see the childish employee as 
irrational, then this is because we have accepted a system of norms that 
not only treats unfairness as a matter of arbitrariness, prejudice, or 
favoritism but also refuses to call the mere thwarting of desires unfair.  
We have accepted the right normative system and she has accepted the 
wrong system.  This might seem merely to redescribe at the level of 
normative systems the clash between the moral judgments we make 
and the moral judgments she makes.  The difference, however, is that 
acceptance of this or that system of norms is adjudicated differently 
from, and more effectively than, the acceptance or rejection of isolated 
values, norms, terms, explanations, and judgments.  This kind of 
 
 132 See, e.g., SHAFER-LANDAU, supra note 76 (stating and defending a non-naturalistic 
moral realism); Richard Boyd, How to Be a Moral Realist, in ESSAYS ON MORAL REALISM 181 
(Geoffrey Sayre-McCord ed. 1988) (stating and defending a naturalistic moral realism). 
 133 GIBBARD, supra note 12, at 218. 
 134 See id. at 154. 
 135 See id. at 160–64. 
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adjudication helps us with the childish employee because it expresses 
our reasons for judging her conduct as we feel compelled to do.136 
If we reject a system of norms that equates “unfair” with “thwarts 
my desires,” and hold the employee to be irrational in accepting childish 
systems of emotions and norms, how is this conflict adjudicated?  We 
can begin by noting that disagreements over which system of norms to 
accept are governed by higher-order norms: norms that govern the 
choice of systems of norms.137  Consistency, for example, is a norm for 
the choice of systems of norms.  Gibbard writes that a system of these 
higher-order norms “amounts to a story of when it is rational to accept 
norms and when it is not.”138  This is a four-part story of normative 
discussion,139 within a community of judgment140 exercising mutual 
influence,141 leading to normative governance.142  
This process sounds more complex and formal than it is.  Consider 
the first two parts of the story of the choice of systems of norms: 
normative discussion within a community of judgment.  Imagine that 
you hear a conversation on a train between two other passengers.143  
Their indignant, incredulous, and aggrieved tone of voice catches your 
attention first.  Listening more closely, you catch expressions such as 
“seriously?” “unbelievable!” “that’s just embarrassing,” and “immature.”  
You gradually gather that a fellow employee of one of the passengers 
was passed over for a promotion, and insisted, against all efforts to 
convince her otherwise, that she should have been promoted because 
her employer was her best friend.  The conversation dwells particularly 
on her inexplicable insistence on a right to favoritism, her repeatedly 
citing “I wanted that job, and he knew it,” as the reason she was entitled 
to it, and her red-faced fury at anyone who told her she was wrong.  You 
find yourself in full agreement that the childish employee was in the 
wrong, and that the worst part was indeed her belief that a right to 
favoritism entitled her to the job.  You sum up your feelings to yourself 
with the word “childish.”  You are at that point part of a community of 
judgment, evincing a relevant emotion, expressing a judgment in 
 
 136 See id. at 154–56, 181–82. 
 137 Id. at 168. 
 138 Id. at 181. 
 139 See GIBBARD, supra note 12, at 72–73, 231, 248–50.  
 140 See id. at 201–08, 233–48. 
 141 See id. at 177. 
 142 See id. at 79–80. 
 143 Gibbard invites us to think of “how much overheard conversation on sidewalks, 
buses, and the like consists in recounting problematic events such as personal 
confrontations, apparently to elicit reactions.”  Id. at 72.   
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emotively charged words.144  You have engaged in a shared emotional 
and moral evaluation of the situation involving the persuasive effects of 
emotionally laden and emotively charged language.145  Most 
importantly, you have gone beyond the condemnation of the employee’s 
behavior to a condemnation of the childish moral system that led her to 
believe she had a right to favoritism.  The reason for this is that she has 
violated the system of moral norms that you regard as rational.  This 
illustrates how “moral judgments consist in the acceptance of norms to 
govern moral emotions.”146   
The example of the childish employee also illustrates the third part 
of Gibbard’s story about the choice of normative systems: the higher-
order norms that govern mutual influence.147  The office-wide effort to 
persuade the childish employee that she was mistaken about her rights 
was subject to norms beyond consistency.  The childish employee could 
rightly demand that others be sincere and open in their attempts to 
persuade her.148  They could not simply browbeat her into agreement.149  
The others cannot demand that she accept more than what actually 
follows from the premises they both accept, plus shared supporting 
observations.150  The other employees could not privilege their views 
because they hold them,151 or insist that the relevant higher-order 
norms have less flexibility than they actually do.152  In short, the others 
could not attempt to persuade her of anything lacking a standpoint-
independent validity.153   
If and when we meet the demands of these higher-order norms, 
then we generate normative authority, the fourth part of the story of the 
choice of systems of norms.154  If the childish employee proves to be 
incorrigible, insisting not only on a right to favoritism but also on norms 
for anger and resentment that authorize these emotions whenever her 
desires are thwarted, then she must be excluded from the community of 
 
 144 See id. at 73. 
 145 See GIBBARD, supra note 12, at 72. 
 146 Id. at 129. 
 147 Id. at 177. 
 148 See id. at 190.  
 149 See id. at 189–90. 
 150 See id. at 191. 
 151 See GIBBARD, supra note 12, at 182. 
 152 See id. at 190. 
 153 See id. at 191. 
 154 See id. at 193. 
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judgment we occupy.155  Norm expressivism is not relativism, 
however.156  The thesis is not that one community makes normative 
judgments that are valid for them, while we make judgments that are 
valid for us.  We say that the childish employee, and anyone who agrees 
with her about the thwarting of desires as rational anger, is not only 
mistaken but also irrational.157  It does not make sense for anyone to do 
what she is doing, emotionally or morally. 
The adjudication of moral choices at the level of the choice of moral 
systems confers as much “objectivity” as it is reasonable to expect in our 
norms and judgments, obviating the need to adjudicate isolated 
evaluations, norms, or judgments, along with any need to appeal to 
moral realism.158  The exercise of normative authority under the norms 
governing the choice of moral systems is not relativistic; nor is it, at the 
other end of the spectrum, dogmatic.  Normative authority functions to 
exclude159 and inform.160  If we are to say that the childish employee is 
irrational, then we must have a story to tell—one that explains why she 
cannot rationally rest on her preferred norms for anger and 
resentment.161  The metaethical story we would tell in her case would 
be a story of the inadequacy of childish judgments and the norms they 
entail, within a normative community of adults coping with a complex 
and unpredictable world.  Moral discussion serves to coordinate the 
actions of society and to achieve consensus on matters that are essential 
to social life.162  The story that excludes the childish employee 
maximizes normative coordination and consensus, giving our 
community of judgment the widest scope possible.163  The value of our 
broad, coordinated, consensual, rational community of judgment is, 
specifically, survival value in natural selection.164  There are survival 
costs to exclusion and repression, and survival benefits in 
accommodation and tolerance.165  We exclude people such as the 
 
 155 Perhaps unnecessarily, I will note that Gibbard is speaking figuratively.  There is 
no organized community with a designated authority who banishes those who do not 
accept the community’s norms. 
 156 See GIBBARD, supra note 12, at 214, 216–17. 
 157 See id. at 164–66, 181. 
 158 See id. at 199–203. 
 159 See id. at 199. 
 160 See id. at 212.  
 161 See GIBBARD, supra note 12, at 193. 
 162 See id. at 76–77, 282–83. 
 163 See id. at 211–13. 
 164 See, e.g., id. at 219–26.  
 165 See, e.g., id. at 238–48.  If this danger seems far-fetched, consider the possibility of 
a high-level government official who understands “unfair” to mean “thwarts my 
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childish employee from the community of moral judgment only when 
the cost of including her—in terms of coordination, consensus, and 
rationality—is too great.166  The survival value of normative authority 
provides as much “objectivity” as the human condition allows. 
C.  Quasi-Realism 
The metaethical theories that I have described as subjectivist 
theories are more often referred to as expressivist theories.167  To say 
that our moral values, norms, and judgments are expressive can mean 
several different things, depending on what one supposes is being 
expressed: emotions instead of meanings, according to Ayer, or 
commitments to normative systems, as Gibbard argues.  Simon 
Blackburn’s “quasi-realism” is an elaboration of David Hume’s 
philosophy,168 so it would be fair to say that “sentiment” is what is 
expressed, according to quasi-realism. 169  It is more enlightening, 
however, to interrogate Blackburn’s metaethics along two other lines.  
We can ask, first, what does it mean to “express” value?  And we can ask, 
second, what kind of intellectual exercise is Blackburn describing in 
when he portrays the expression of value as projection?   
1.  The Projection of Morality 
Blackburn’s quasi-realism is an application of Hume’s projectivism, 
the most prominent instance of which is his explanation of causation.170  
If two events follow one another, Hume argued, we never know if one 
event has caused the other or if, on the other hand, the events merely 
occurred in sequence but independently from one another.  Put another 
way, it is impossible to say what we claim to have perceived when we 
attribute causation to events.  If we think of causation as solid surfaces 
bouncing off one another, as we tend to do, then we have merely 
defaulted the problem to the behavior of solid surfaces, and the 
possibility that this behavior is mere coincidence.  If we think of 
 
desires,” and the threat to basic legal norms and informal norms of government that this 
person’s official actions would pose. 
 166 See id. at 197–98. 
 167 See David Faraci, On Leaving Room for Doubt: Using Frege-Geach to Illuminate 
Expressivism’s Problem with Objectivity, 12 OXFORD STUDIES IN METAETHICS 244, 244 n.1 
(2017) (identifying Blackburn and Gibbard as expressivists).  
 168 See BLACKBURN,  supra note 14, at 170–71 (describing quasi-realism as a Humean 
projectivist theory).   
 169 See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 589 (1739) (P.H. Nidditch, ed., 2d ed. 
1978) (“Moral good and evil are certainly distinguish’d by our sentiments, not by reason 
. . . .”). 
 170 See BLACKBURN, supra note 14, at 210. 
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causation as the behavior of atoms or sub-atomic particles, then we have 
merely shifted the problem of solid surfaces bouncing off one another to 
a microscopic level.  The most we can say with confidence is that we 
observe events as occurring in regular, predictable sequences.  Any 
perception of causation beyond these regularities is something that we 
project onto events.   
Hume argued that projectivism changes nothing in how we explain 
and justify our beliefs concerning causation.  If all we say about 
causation can be said in terms of observations and judgments of regular 
sequences of events, and if these statements can be true, then we have 
no reason to go any further in seeking reasons for belief in causes and 
effects.  This explanation entails a view of the truth conditions for 
causation—whatever it is that makes beliefs about causation true or 
false—as something other than a correspondence with reality and other 
than something operating out there, waiting for us to discover it.  In this 
sense, projectivism is an anti-realist theory.  To surrender the view of 
causation as a feature of events themselves, however, does not require 
us to surrender the beliefs that we express in terms of causation, or to 
doubt their truth.   
Hume applied the same view to ethics, and the anti-realism of 
projectivism raises the worries that motivate the subjective stop: that 
because morality is not a feature of the world, it must be irrational, 
arbitrary, and personal instead of public.  Following Hume, Blackburn 
explains morality as an expression of value, and moral expression as the 
projection of these values onto the world.171  He develops Hume’s ethical 
projectivism more fully, in such a way as to relieve these worries.   
Projectivism raises at least two questions about morality, which 
are the topics of the next two subsections.  The first question is, if we 
project moral value onto the world, and claim that we can engage in 
moralizing as if morality were to be found in the world, what does the 
“as if” mean?  Does the projectivist embrace the fiction, as a skeptic 
would, or does she give the fiction a function, as a pragmatist would?  
Blackburn argues that the “as if” of projectivism and quasi-realism is not 
a fiction at all.  Even if our sentiments color the facts, they are still the 
facts, and they impose significant constraints on our moral beliefs.   
The second question is, what replaces the realist’s view of moral 
truth as correspondence to features of the world?  The standard 
alternative is a coherence theory, meaning that any true belief has that 
status by virtue of its being a feature of an internally consistent, 
mutually reinforcing system of belief.  Quasi-realism rests on a 
 
 171 See id. at 170–71. 
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coherence theory, but coherence theories have their own serious 
weaknesses.  Blackburn measures quasi-realism’s version of coherence 
against the common-sense appeal of the correspondence view and 
formulates quasi-realism accordingly.  
2.  Projectivism and Quasi-Realism 
The note of “as if” in Blackburn’s rejection of realism and 
correspondence is hard to ignore.  If morality does not correspond to 
features of the world, then it seems that the best we can do is to act as if 
it did.172  This might be a good strategy, but it theorizes as pragmatism, 
and quasi-realism is very different from pragmatism.173  Blackburn 
argues that moral statements can be true even if they are projections.  
Projected moral values, norms, and judgments “are not the children of 
our sentiments in the sense that were our sentiments to vanish, moral 
truths would alter as well.”174  As with causation, projected moral values, 
norms, and judgments are stable, persistent, and predictable because 
they still depend on the facts of the narrower, less abundant world onto 
which we project morality.  The role of projection is to color our 
experience of the facts, giving them value, but this is still an experience 
of facts.  It might not be wrong to set fire to a cat if cats or fire were other 
than what they are, but this radically different moral evaluation would 
be attributable to a different set of facts, not a different set of sentiments. 
175  If our sentiments about cats were hostile to the point of deranged 
pyromania, it would still be wrong to set fire to cats—cats being 
defenseless against cruelty, and cruelty being what it is, projected or not.   
The stability, persistence, and predictability of moral evaluations 
such as cruelty are also features of projection itself.  Regarding Hume’s 
projectivism and causation, Blackburn writes:  “[a]gain, since we have a 
purpose in so projecting we will have standards by which to assess the 
evidence we use for the existence of causal connections, and the quasi-
realist can again earn a right to the notion of truth, and a notion of the 
true causal structure of things.”176  We also have standards by which to 
assess the evidence we use for the existence of moral commitments, and 
we can earn a right to the notion of truth and a notion of the true moral 
structure of things.   
 
 172 Id. at 257 (“Does this make moral commitments true in the same sense as others, 
or only in a different sense?  I do not greatly commend the question.  What is important 
is our right to practise, think, worry, assert, and argue as though they are.”). 
 173 See SIMON BLACKBURN, ESSAYS IN QUASI-REALISM 66–67 (1993). 
 174 See BLACKBURN,  supra note 14, at 219 n.21. 
 175 Id. at 219. 
 176 Id. at 211. 
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One might balk at the substitution of “the existence of moral 
commitments” for “the existence of causal connections” in the preceding 
paragraph because causal connections seem to be well-rooted in the 
world, as compared to moral commitments.  But this objection attacks 
realism where realism is not assumed or intended.  Our moral 
commitments do not have to rise to the level of causal connections; each 
starts at the same level as the other.  Regarding both causation and 
morality, Humean “existence” refers to projected attributes, not the 
realists’ “existence” as something in the world that is entirely 
independent of us. 
3.  Coherence and the Epistemic Virtues 
Blackburn frequently describes the truth of projected moral values, 
norms, and judgments as a matter of earning the right to moralize.177  
This expression has a specific meaning.  We earn the right to call our 
projected moral commitments true if we exercise epistemic virtues as 
we work out those commitments.178  “The root idea,” Blackburn notes, 
“is that the virtue of truth is constructed from the virtue of method.”179 
To understand the notion of epistemic virtue, one has only to think 
of the epistemic vice of the conspiracy theorist.  He reels off a long list of 
facts, drawing tenuous connections between them, and declares that he 
has discovered the truth “because it all fits.”  Instead of doing this, he 
ought to be questioning the provenance and reliability of his facts.  He 
ought to be looking for facts and reasons that disprove his thesis, in the 
manner of scientific peer review.  He ought to pick up the pieces of his 
disproven thesis and either formulate a better one or concede error.  In 
other words, the conspiracy theorist ought to exercise epistemic virtue 
instead of epistemic vice.  As Blackburn recognizes, the principal set of 
epistemic virtues is indeed found in the natural sciences.  He states, 
“[c]onsider the common marks of merit in scientific theories: simplicity, 
responsiveness to experiment, utility, theoretical elegance and strength, 
fertility, association with familiar models rendering processes 
intelligible, and so on.”180  If we moralize in the same way, virtuously, we 
earn the right to call our moral commitments true. 
 It is troubling, initially, to realize that Blackburn’s rejection of a 
correspondence theory of truth led him to opt for a coherence theory 
instead.  Reliance on coherent explanation alone—the hallmark of 
conspiracy theories—is one of the chief epistemic vices.  One must 
 
 177 See, e.g., id.  
 178 Id. at 237–48. 
 179 See BLACKBURN, supra note 14, at 247. 
 180 Id. at 237. 
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emphasize the word “alone,” however, because some degree of 
coherence is itself an epistemic virtue.  Mutual reinforcement between 
beliefs does not establish their truth, but it does contribute to their 
credibility.  This credibility is bolstered by epistemic virtues.  
Elaborating on the coherence supposed by quasi-realism, Blackburn 
identifies three complementary epistemic virtues. 
The first virtue of a defensible coherence theory is 
comprehensiveness.  The more experience one draws into a coherent 
explanation, the more mutual support it has.  This raises a powerful 
objection: one way to make an explanation comprehensive is to add 
falsehoods to it.181  Since any falsehood can be added at will to any 
explanation, the comprehensiveness of the coherent explanation 
signifies nothing.182  One way to defend comprehensiveness as a virtue 
of coherent explanations is to invoke a second virtue of coherence: 
control over what is admitted to the explanation.  Any element admitted 
to the network of coherent belief must have the right pedigree.  That is, 
it must have epistemic virtues other than coherence, such as the virtues 
of the scientific method: “observations, memory, induction, and sober 
practices of enquiry and judgement.”183 
Drawing epistemic virtues from the natural sciences presents a 
problem, however: it is difficult to invoke the virtues of science in 
support of moralizing without implying that these virtues will lead to 
success in morality comparable to success in science.184  Specifically, it 
is possible to see scientific explanations converging on the truth, but 
convergence is less clear where moral explanations are concerned.  
Progress in science has reliable pragmatic indicators: roughly, things 
 
 181 The viral internet conspiracy theory known as QAnon illustrates this weakness 
perfectly. 
QAnon is the umbrella term for a sprawling set of internet conspiracy 
theories that allege, falsely, that the world is run by a cabal of Satan-
worshiping pedophiles who are plotting against Mr. Trump while 
operating a global child sex-trafficking ring. 
QAnon followers believe that this clique includes top Democrats 
including Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama and George Soros, as well as 
a number of entertainers and Hollywood celebrities like Oprah 
Winfrey, Tom Hanks, Ellen DeGeneres and religious figures including 
Pope Francis and the Dalai Lama.  Many of them also believe that, in 
addition to molesting children, members of this group kill and eat 
their victims in order to extract a life-extending chemical from their 
blood. 
Kevin Roose, What is QAnon, the Viral Pro-Trump Conspiracy Theory?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/what-is-qanon.html. 
 182 See BLACKBURN, supra note 14, at 239. 
 183 Id. at 240. 
 184 Id. at 241. 
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work better when sound science underwrites our efforts.  Progress in 
morality might be judged on pragmatic grounds—certainly things work 
better once the moral prohibition on homicide takes root—but morality 
has little of the natural sciences’ precision, and the inference of moral 
progress from moral success is correspondingly vague.  Dispelling this 
implication points to a third necessary virtue in coherent explanations: 
varying levels of conviction.  Blackburn suggests that we take a more 
modest stance toward moral truth than we do toward scientific truth, 
accepting the basic level of conviction provided by our experience of 
projection.  “When we alert our senses nature forces us to the beliefs 
which then flood in.  The most we can do is to use those, and our best 
ways of forming [controlled, comprehensive, coherent] systems.  If truth 
is anything more than this, how could we possibly regard ourselves as 
knowing anything about it?”185  Projected value is constrained by the 
facts onto which it is projected, by the nature of projection itself, and by 
the application of epistemic virtues within a coherent body of belief.  
This provides us with as much moral truth as we need.  Specifically, for 
our purposes, it provides us with enough moral truth to reject the 
subjective stop. 
VI.  SUBJECTIVIST METAETHICS AND MAJESTIC LAW 
This Part will explain how modern subjectivist metaethics 
undermines the subjective stop and supports the pursuit of majestic 
law.  Much of the discussion will portray legal reasoning as tracking the 
explanations of moral rationality and moral truth provided by Gibbard 
and Blackburn.  The point of these tracking explanations is not to say 
that courts follow procedures for moral rationality, as prescribed by 
Gibbard or Blackburn, in a way that leads us to moral truth.  The point 
is, instead, that law and legal reasoning can be described in terms of 
these theories, so that, if Gibbard or Blackburn (or both) is right about 
rationality and truth in morality, then majestic law’s claims to 
rationality and truth are supportable, and the subjective stop is not. 
A.  Claims to Moral Rationality and Moral Truth 
In his opinion for the Court in Gideon v. Wainwright, incorporating 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and applying it to the states, 
Justice Hugo Black wrote this: 
Not only these precedents but also reason and reflection 
require us to recognize that in our adversary system of 
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor 
 
 185 Id. at 242–43. 
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to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel 
is provided for him.  This seems to us to be an obvious truth 
. . . . From the very beginning, our state and national 
constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on 
procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair 
trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant 
stands equal before the law.  This noble ideal cannot be 
realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his 
accusers without a lawyer to assist him.186 
Gideon overruled Betts v. Brady, but Justice Black quoted this language 
from Betts: “That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of 
fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in 
other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, fall short 
of such denial.”187  This is legal reasoning in the style of majestic law, in 
its invocations of fairness, justice, equality, and nobility.  
We have seen this style of reasoning in Justice Warren’s Miranda 
opinion and Justice Stevens’s McDonald dissent.  In Justice Black’s 
Gideon opinion, however, we also see a defining feature of majestic law 
as a style of legal reasoning: its claims to moral rationality and moral 
truth.  For Justice Black, the fact that some procedures are unfair is an 
“obvious truth” that is arrived at by “reason and reflection.”  His reliance 
on “the universal sense of justice” can also be fairly read as a claim to 
moral truth.   
Courts seldom proclaim moral truth, but there are other instances 
of their doing so.  In Rochin v. California, a substantive Due Process case 
in criminal law, Justice Frankfurter described Due Process values as 
being “deeply rooted in reason and the compelling traditions of the legal 
profession.”188  In Mapp v. Ohio, incorporating the Fourth Amendment’s 
exclusionary rule and applying it to the states, Justice Clark wrote: “Our 
decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more 
than that which the Constitution guarantees him . . . .”189  Justice Stevens 
argued in similar terms in McDonald that the “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty” standard of Due Process “is a recognition that the 
postulates of liberty have a universal character . . . .  Whether 
conceptualized as a ‘rational continuum’ of legal precepts . . . or a 
seamless web of moral commitments, the rights embraced by the liberty 
clause transcend the local and the particular.”190  The word “transcend,” 
 
 186 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 187 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942). 
 188 342 U.S. 165, 171 (1952).  
 189 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). 
 190 McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 871–72 (2010) (quoting Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).  
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while problematic for the reasons given above, nevertheless clearly 
denotes moral truth, as do “postulates” and “universal.”  And of course, 
the ideas of a rational continuum and seamless web refer to rationality 
in moral reasoning, albeit in coherentist terms. 
Moral rationality and moral truth in legal reasoning is not a matter 
of safe-as-houses “objective” decision-making versus the boogeyman 
“subjective” decision-making that motivates the subjective stop.  In 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, Justice Felix Frankfurter argued:  
[S]triking the balance [in Due Process analysis] implies the 
exercise of judgment.  This is the inescapable judicial task in 
giving substantive content, legally enforced, to the Due 
Process Clause, and it is a task ultimately committed to this 
Court.  It must not be an exercise of whim or will.  It must be 
an overriding judgment founded on something much deeper 
and more justifiable than personal preference.  As far as it lies 
within human limitations, it must be an impersonal judgment.  
It must rest on fundamental presuppositions rooted in history 
to which widespread acceptance may fairly be attributed.  
Such a judgment must be arrived at in a spirit of humility when 
it counters the judgment of the State’s highest court.  But, in 
the end, judgment cannot be escaped—the judgment of this 
Court.191 
The idea of “objective” legal reasoning perpetuates the subjective stop’s 
hard subjective/objective distinction.  Instead of contrasting “personal 
preference” with “objectivity,” Justice Frankfurter contrasts it with 
judgments that exhibit impersonality, humility, deference to others’ 
views, and the willing acceptance of responsibility for one’s beliefs.  In 
Rochin, Justice Frankfurter acknowledged that “[w]e may not draw on 
our merely personal and private notions.”192  He contrasted this judicial 
vice, not with “objectivity,” but with epistemic virtues: “[t]o practice the 
requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient objectivity no doubt 
demands of judges the habit of self-discipline and self-criticism, 
incertitude that one’s own views are incontestable and alert tolerance 
toward views not shared.”193  Frankfurter thought that legal reasoning 
should aspire to the virtues of empirical inquiry.  “In each case ‘due 
process of law’ requires an evaluation based on a disinterested inquiry 
pursued in the spirit of science, on a balanced order of facts exactly and 
fairly stated, on the detached consideration of conflicting claims.”194 
 
 191 354 U.S. 234, 267 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 192 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952).  
 193 Id. at 171.  
 194 Id. at 172. 
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The reasoning of Black, Frankfurter, and Stevens, and of majestic 
law generally, is well described in Blackburn’s terms.  We can claim that 
a moral norm or judgment is true if it is part of a coherent moral system 
that is comprehensive and controlled.  Any body of legal doctrine meets 
the minimum requirement of coherence.  It consists of a set of mutually 
reinforcing rules and standards that are—if not always, at least for the 
most part—non-contradictory.  The coherent Due Process doctrine that 
Stevens describes in McDonald is comprehensive, encompassing 
“historical and empirical data of various kinds . . . .  [t]extual 
commitments laid down elsewhere in the Constitution, judicial 
precedents, English common law, legislative and social facts, scientific 
and professional developments, practices of other civilized 
societies, and, above all else, the ‘traditions and conscience of our 
people’. . . .”195  To avoid the pitfalls of coherentism—as evinced by the 
conspiracy theorist—we abide by epistemic virtues.  These are the 
virtues of science, as Justice Frankfurter notes in Rochin: disinterested 
inquiry, facts exactly and fairly stated, and the detached consideration 
of conflicting claims.196  Of the epistemic virtues that Blackburn lists, law 
also aspires to simplicity, theoretical elegance, and strength,197 along 
with supporting “observation, memory, induction, and sober practices 
of enquiry and judgement.”198   
As broad, deep, and “value laden” as majestic standards of Due 
Process are, they do not claim transcendent truth.  There is no need to 
deny that values are subjective, even in the strong sense that they exist 
only because we project them onto the world.  The facts onto which 
value is projected are as stable and predictable as we ordinarily assume 
them to be, and our subjective, projected moral commitments are 
rational and true at the level of conviction appropriate to morality and 
majestic law.  We can go on arguing about right and wrong, good and 
bad, as we always have done, but with confidence that these debates are 
meaningful, because moral commitments are rational.  They are rational 
in ways that, as Blackburn says, earn the right to be called true. 
Gibbard’s insight concerning the adjudication of moral conflicts at 
the level of systems of the norm is also helpful in understanding how 
moral rationality works in law.  In 1976, in United States v. Barker, the 
District of Columbia Circuit Court reversed the convictions of two men 
convicted of conspiring to violate another person’s civil rights.199  
 
 195 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 872. 
 196 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172. 
 197 See BLACKBURN, supra note 14, at 237. 
 198 Id. at 240. 
 199 United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 944, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  
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Barker and an accomplice had burglarized the office of Daniel Ellsberg’s 
psychiatrist, in the service of Richard Nixon’s 1972 re-election 
campaign.200  Their convictions were overturned because they were 
denied the right to present evidence and argument on a mistake of law 
theory: that they had relied on the word of a low-level Nixon 
Administration official who purported to have legal authority to 
authorize a search.201  As a rule, reliance on official misstatements of the 
law as a defense in criminal cases is tightly circumscribed.  Traditionally, 
not even the advice of the state’s attorney was sufficient for such a 
defense.202  The Model Penal Code provides, in effect, that only the advice 
of the state’s attorney is sufficient.203  This accords with the fact that 
mistake of law defenses undermine an attribute of law that is both 
conceptually and pragmatically fundamental: its binding effect.204  The 
decision in Barker was in error. 
Gibbard’s norm expressivism describes the moral error committed 
in Barker.  To say that something is right or good is to endorse a system 
of norms that identifies it as right or good, and to recognize that system’s 
authority within a community of judgment.  One can say that other 
normative systems are mistaken and that moral beliefs and actions that 
are rational under these systems of norms are irrational under a correct 
system of norms.  We can condemn the conduct of the childish employee 
as morally wrong because she is mistaken about unfairness under our, 
correct, system of moral norms.  
The reversal of the convictions in Barker was wrong because the 
majority accepted a system of norms under which it was morally 
rational to excuse a politically motivated burglary in violation of a 
citizen’s civil rights.  The burglars had guided their actions by the 
morality of the Nixon cabal.205  This was a mistaken normative system, 
 
 200 See id. at 933–34. 
 201 See id. at 949. 
 202 See, e.g., Hopkins v. State, 69 A.2d 456, 460 (Md. 1950). 
 203 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(4)(b)(iv) (AM. LAW INST. 2019) (authorizing a mistake 
of law defense for reliance on “an official interpretation of the public officer or body 
charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration or 
enforcement of the law defining the offense.”). 
 204 On the pragmatic rationale, see OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 48 
(1881) (“[T]o admit the excuse at all would be to encourage ignorance where the law-
maker has determined to make men know and obey, and justice to the individual is 
rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of the scales.”).  On the 
conceptual rationale, see SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 212 (2011) (“From the perspective of 
legal institutions . . . their plans morally bind regardless of whether those who are bound 
consent to their authority.”). 
 205 One of the other conspirators was Egil Krogh.  See United States v. Barker, 546 
F.2d 940, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  Krogh, a lawyer, was disbarred, but was later reinstated 
on the grounds, inter alia, that he had overcome the effects of “his position of 
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and the burglars’ beliefs and actions were morally wrong because they 
were irrational under any acceptable moral system.  Their patriotism 
was misconceived as loyalty to Richard Nixon; their good intentions 
were corrupted to the point of criminality; and they learned the wrong 
moral lessons from their involvement with the CIA—a predictable 
outcome.  As fellow conspirator Egil Krogh later explained: “[t]he 
premise of our action was the strongly held view within certain 
precincts of the White House that the president and those functioning 
on his behalf could carry out illegal acts with impunity if they were 
convinced that the nation’s security demanded it.”206 
In its insupportable expansion of a mistake of law defense, the 
Barker majority endorsed this mistaken system of norms.  The reversal 
of the burglars’ convictions was irrational, most immediately, under the 
set of norms governing mistake of law; and behind this, the normative 
systems of the criminal law, the principles of a rule of law society, the 
moral authority of law, and the rational demands of morality.  As Judge 
Harold Leventhal pleaded in his dissent, “[i]s this judicial novelty, a bold 
injection of mistake of law as a valid defense to criminal liability, really 
being wrought in a case where defendants are charged with combining 
to violate civil and constitutional rights?”207  None of this is to say that 
moral rationality or moral truth exists independently of us.  It is to say 
that to endorse the majority’s expansive view of mistake of law would 
serve society poorly and perhaps imperil its survival in the long-term.208   
B.  A Refusal to Reduce 
The conditional subjective stop is an exercise in reductionism, such 
as the reduction of law to text, history, original intent, or tallies of state 
law.  This reductionism is a relic of Ayer’s caveman emotivism.  The 
positivist school to which Ayer belonged attempted to reformulate value 
statements in verifiable, sense-experience terms.209  For example, talk 
about Henry’s “piety” should be reduced to talk about who admires 
Henry, and why, because an evaluation of piety entails a commitment to 
 
subordination to the President, and the ‘frantic atmosphere’ in the White House at that 
time.”  Matter of Krogh, 610 P.2d 1319, 1320 (Wash. 1980). 
 206 Egil Krogh, The Break-In That History Forgot, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/30/opinion/30krogh.html.  
 207 Barker, 546 F.2d at 958 (Leventhal, J., dissenting). 
 208 Cf. GIBBARD, supra note 12, at 238–48 (discussing the cost of accommodating 
irrational norms in a community of judgment).  Barker serves as a reminder of the threat 
that a presidential cult of personality presents to a democracy.  In addition to the 
pathologies described by Krogh, tribalism, willful ignorance, and belief in paranoid 
conspiracy theories are good reasons to reject such a system of norms. 
 209 BLACKBURN, supra note 14, at 152. 
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theism that the positivists were not willing to make.  The substitution of 
reasons for admiration in place of piety allowed them to shed this 
unwanted theistic commitment.210  In Ayer’s emotivism, the substitution 
of pro and con exclamations in place of pro and con value judgments 
allowed him to shed a commitment to meaning in moral 
talk—something he was constrained to do in any case because his 
theory of meaning required it.  Proponents of the subjective stop appear 
to feel the same constraint, and to have adopted the same method of 
coping.  
The problem with a reductive substitution of B terms (reasons for 
admiration) for A terms (piety), however, is that it raises a paradox.  If 
B is an improved version of A, then the more B improves A the more 
likely it is that B is not a reduction of A, but something different from A 
instead.211  If we shed the theism of “piety” in favor of non-theistic 
reasons for admiration, then we are not talking about piety at all.  
“Because of this problem,” Blackburn points out, “there is a tendency for 
reductionist programmes to take on a revisionist air.”212  Ayer revised 
moral statements into something else entirely: meaningless 
exclamations.  In law, the reductivism of the subjective stop has a 
revisionist air.  If we shed the intrinsic features of justice, fairness, and 
the rest of law’s moral commitments, then we are not talking about law’s 
moral commitments at all.   
Majestic law rejects reduction as a requirement of legal reasoning.  
Instead, it permits moral commitments to operate in legal reasoning on 
their own prescriptive terms, without a purported translation to 
descriptive terms.  Once again, Justice Stevens makes the point in 
McDonald: “To the extent the principal opinion could be read to imply 
that the historical pedigree of a right is the exclusive or dispositive 
determinant of its status under the Due Process Clause, the opinion is 
seriously mistaken.”213  Elsewhere in his dissent, he writes: 
Justice Cardozo’s [‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’] 
test undeniably requires judges to apply their own reasoned 
judgment, but that does not mean it involves an exercise in 
abstract philosophy.  In addition to other constraints I will 
soon discuss, . . . historical and empirical data of various kinds 
ground the analysis.  Textual commitments laid down 
elsewhere in the Constitution, judicial precedents, English 
common law, legislative and social facts, scientific and 
 
 210 See id. at 153.  
 211 Id. at 154. 
 212 Id. at 156. 
 213 McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 874 (2010). 
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professional developments, practices of other civilized 
societies, and, above all else, the ‘traditions and conscience of 
our people,’ are critical variables.  They can provide evidence 
about which rights really are vital to ordered liberty, as well 
as a spur to judicial action.214 
It is all too easy to read Justice Stevens’s appeal to “historical and 
empirical data,” “[t]extual commitments,” and so on as recommending 
the reduction of moral commitments to revealed preferences.  His 
disavowal of “abstract philosophy,” however, is not a rejection of 
“subjective” moral commitments; it is a rejection of a metaethical 
strawman that is often raised to discredit majestic law.215  Likewise, his 
invocation of “evidence” of what is “vital to ordered liberty” is not a 
suggestion that the moral commitment to ordered liberty can be 
reduced to “[t]extual commitments,” “legislative and social facts,” or 
“historical and empirical data.”  Such a reduction would indicate an 
aspiration to transmute “subjective” into “objective,” and Stevens 
consistently expressed doubts about this aspiration.   
If Stevens’s assurances that the Due Process standard of “implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty” entails the examination of text, history, 
and “social facts,” and if this examination is not part of a reduction, then 
one can fairly ask what it means to say that these things “provide 
evidence about which rights really are vital to ordered liberty.”  
Gibbard’s norm expressivism provides a non-reductive way to 
understand Stevens’s reference to evidence.   
Recall that the advantage of seeing moral controversy in Gibbard’s 
terms is that the adjudication of individual moral commitments is 
different from the adjudication of conflicting systems of norms within 
which these commitments are rational.  We can read Stevens’s catalog 
of relevant considerations in Due Process analysis as a system of norms 
under which his judgment on the Due Process and Second Amendment 
issues presented in McDonald is rational.  He says explicitly that the 
rights granted by the Due Process Clauses are “a seamless web of moral 
commitments.”216  This conceptually thick, morally rich system has 
evolved in the context of, and for the purposes of, interpreting the Due 
Process Clauses in United States courts.  This moral system properly 
draws on a wide range of sources and incorporates moral commitments 
from these sources into a comprehensive constitutional analysis.  To 
 
 214 Id. at 872. 
 215 See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169–72 (1952) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“Due Process of law thus conceived is not to be derided as resort to a revival of ‘natural 
law.’”). 
 216 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 872. 
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recognize a legal rule as a requirement of Due Process “not because the 
States have always honored it, but because it is ‘essential to free 
government and to the maintenance of democratic institutions’” is to 
make a normative evaluation of democratic institutions, not merely the 
legal rule at issue.217   
The richness of this moral system is the reason behind the majestic 
law quality of many Due Process standards.  To determine which legal 
rules contribute to “a fair and enlightened system of justice” requires 
evaluation according to not only the familiar moral values of fairness 
and justice but also the less familiar moral criterion of “enlightened.”218  
Similarly, to identify “immutable principles of justice, which inhere in 
the very idea of free government,”219 or “immunities . . . implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty,”220 requires us to deliberate on justice and 
liberty as such, in terms of their etymology, history, conception, and 
extension.221  Specifically, both of these standards direct legal reasoning 
toward conceptualization: justice as an inherent property of free 
government; and immunities as implicit properties of ordered liberty.  
These Due Process standards are characteristic of majestic law. 
A judgment under these Due Process standards expresses a 
subjective judgment in rational, empirical terms.  They satisfy the 
second order norms by which the rationality of normative systems is 
judged.  By virtue of their evolving in the context of a common law 
method, these Due Process standards are the product of a systematic 
process of normative discussion, within a legal community of judgment, 
exercising mutual influence in precedent, leading to normative 
governance not only by law but also by moral commitments in law.  Law 
aspires to consistency, of course, but law as an enterprise also requires 
sincerity,222 inferences from shared premises based on shared 
supporting observations,223 refraining from privileging one’s own 
views,224 flexibility,225 and, in general, a pursuit of “standpoint-
 
 217 Id. at 874–75. 
 218 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 219 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 760. 
 220 Palko, 302 U.S. at 324–25. 
 221 See also Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 602 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The 
only way to relax such a grip, the only way to avoid finding in the Constitution the 
personal bias one has placed in it, is to explore the influences that have shaped one’s 
unanalyzed views in order to lay bare prepossessions.”). 
 222 See GIBBARD, supra note 12, at 190.  
 223 See id. at 191. 
 224 See id. at 181. 
 225 See id. at 190. 
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independent validity.”226  When complied with, these norms generate 
normative authority sufficient to justify rejecting judgments that are 
rational only under unacceptable systems of norms. 
This is the sense in which the broad range of moral commitments 
listed by Stevens are ”evidence about which rights really are vital to 
ordered liberty.”227  Reduction is unnecessary as well as misleading, 
because it is evident that the subjectivity of these commitments is 
benign, and there is no reason to pursue phantom “objectivity” in the 
law of Due Process.   
VII.  “CIVILIZED” DUE PROCESS 
Many of the examples of the subjective stop discussed in the 
preceding Parts are taken from Justice Scalia’s concurrence in McDonald 
v. City of Chicago.  The examples are numerous, but this fails to convey 
how deeply his opinion is anchored in the subjective stop.  This is also 
true, for a different reason, of Justice Alito’s plurality opinion.   
Not all of the subjective stops imposed by Scalia are as abrupt (and 
puerile) as his “Who says?”228 in response to Justice Stevens’s 
observation that owning a handgun is not a necessary feature of human 
autonomy, dignity, or equality.229  Most of them, however, are full 
subjective stops.  According to Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens’s 
application of Palko’s “fair and enlightened system of justice” standard 
“basically means picking the rights we want to protect and discarding 
those we do not.”230  The guideposts that Stevens uses to avoid 
“excessive subjectivity” in Due Process analysis are “omnidirectional,” 
and “incapable of restraining judicial whimsy.”231  Stevens’s efforts to 
clearly describe the interests at stake consist of “capacious, hazily 
defined categories,” but not much precision is needed, Scalia quips 
sarcastically, to protect rights to “[s]elf-determination, bodily integrity, 
freedom of conscience, intimate relationships, political equality, dignity, 
[or] respect.”232  And on it goes.  Steven’s methodology “does nothing to 
stop a judge from arriving at any conclusion he sets out to reach.”233  
Stevens’s “criterion . . . is inherently manipulable.”234  His “criterion lets 
 
 226 Id. at 193. 
 227 McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 872 (2010). 
 228 Id. at 800 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 229 See id. at 893. 
 230 Id. at 794. 
 231 Id. at 794–95. 
 232 Id. at 797. 
 233 Id. at 799. 
 234 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 799.  
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judges pick which rights States must respect and those they can 
ignore.”235  “This criterion, too, evidently applies only when judges want 
it to.”236  And, “[o]nce again, principles are applied selectively.”237   
To no one’s surprise, the reason for all this arbitrariness turns out 
to be that Justice Stevens’s Due Process analysis is “subjective,” 
particularly when contrasted to originalism.238  A historical 
methodology, Scalia assures us, “is much less subjective, and intrudes 
much less upon the democratic process.  It is less subjective because it 
depends upon a body of evidence susceptible of reasoned analysis 
rather than a variety of vague ethico-political First Principles whose 
combined conclusion can be found to point in any direction the judges 
favor.”239 
Justice Alito’s plurality opinion more subtly imposed a subjective 
stop and disavowed majestic law.  Because the City of Chicago was 
arguing against the incorporation of the Second Amendment, it relied on 
an all but forgotten “civilization” standard of Due Process from the pre-
incorporation era.  In Twining v. New Jersey, the Self-Incrimination 
Clause was said not to be incorporated because it “has no place in the 
jurisprudence of civilized and free countries outside the domain of the 
common law.”240  In Palko v. Connecticut, Justice Cardozo reasoned that 
the Double Jeopardy Clause, like the Sixth Amendment Jury Guarantee, 
could not be applied to the states on the ground that “[f]ew would be so 
narrow or provincial as to maintain that a fair and enlightened system 
of justice would be impossible without them.”241  In Chicago, Burlington 
and Quincy Railroad Company v. City of Chicago, the Court held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause required compensation for 
property condemned by local governments under eminent domain 
because compensation “was a principle of natural equity, recognized by 
all temperate and civilized governments, from a deep and universal 
sense of its justice”242 and “laid down . . . as a principle of universal 
 
 235 Id. at 800. 
 236 Id. at 801. 
 237 Id. at 802. 
 238 Id. at 793. 
 239 Id. at 804. 
 240 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 113 (1908), overruled, in part, by Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).  The plurality opinion quoted language omitted here: “and it 
is nowhere observed among our own people in the search for truth outside the 
administration of the law.”  Id.  This “search for the truth” refers to police interrogation 
and the privilege against self-incrimination. 
 241 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 242 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 238 (1897); cf. 
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (“While the State has the power to punish, the 
HUIGENS (DO NOT DELETE) 1/7/2021  10:56 AM 
728 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:669 
law.”243  In his plurality opinion, Justice Alito pronounced these 
standards dead.244  Justice Scalia also roundly rejected any standard not 
limited to the moral and legal norms of the United States or Britain.245   
In rejecting the civilization standard of Due Process, the plurality 
opinion merely followed Justice White’s imposition of a subjective stop, 
complete with a metaethical strawman, in footnote fourteen of his 
opinion in Duncan v. Louisiana, in which the Court incorporated the 
Sixth Amendment’s jury guarantee and applied it to the states.  White 
noted that, in past cases, “the Court can be seen as having asked, when 
inquiring into whether some particular procedural safeguard was 
required of a State, if a civilized system could be imagined that would 
not accord the particular protection.”246  Recent cases, he wrote, “have 
proceeded upon the valid assumption that state criminal processes are 
not imaginary and theoretical schemes but actual systems bearing 
virtually every characteristic of the common-law system that has been 
developing contemporaneously in England and in this country.”247  
White’s reference to “imaginary and theoretical schemes” amounts to a 
metaethical strawman of the kind that Justice Scalia erected in 
McDonald.  Administering imaginary schemes might call for a “sixth 
sense instilled in judges when they ascend to the bench.”248  It also calls 
to mind Justice Stevens’s defensive denial that Palko’s “implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty” test “involves an exercise in abstract 
philosophy.”249  
Reading Palko in full, it is no wonder that White imposed a 
subjective stop in Duncan.  Justice Cardozo argued in majestic law terms, 
even though Palko did not expand the protections of the Constitution.  
Cardozo claimed that the non-incorporation of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause was a logical necessity, “dictated by a study and appreciation of 
the meaning, the essential implications, of liberty itself.”250  He 
contrasted the Double Jeopardy right at issue in Palko with the First 
Amendment, which guaranteed freedom of conscience as “a logical 
 
Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized 
standards.”).  
 243 Id. at 236. 
 244 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 760−64 (“The Court [has] made it clear that the 
governing standard is not whether any ‘civilized system [can] be imagined that would 
not accord the particular protection.’”) (second alteration in original) (quoting Duncan 
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968)).  
 245 See id. at 800−01. 
 246 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 n.14. 
 247 Id.  
 248 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 796. 
 249 Id. at 872. 
 250 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937). 
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imperative.”251  This logic produced the truth of the matter.  Freedom of 
speech, he wrote, was “the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly 
every other form of freedom,” and “a pervasive recognition of that truth 
can be traced in our history, political and legal.”252  These were 
existential truths of the kind claimed by moral realism.  The 
incorporation of certain rights turned on “the belief that neither liberty 
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”253  None of this was 
majestic literary style; it was majestic legal reasoning because it had 
substantive legal consequences.  This is why Palko’s civilization 
standard of Due Process drew a subjective stop in Duncan. 
The McDonald majority made quick work of Chicago’s argument by 
treating the civilization standard as an appeal to foreign law.  Justice 
Alito expressed amazement at Chicago’s reliance on the civilization 
standard, writing that, “[i]f our understanding of the right to a jury trial, 
the right against self-incrimination, and the right to counsel were 
necessary attributes of any civilized country, it would follow that the 
United States is the only civilized Nation in the world.”254  Justice Scalia 
argued that “this follow-the-foreign-crowd requirement would 
foreclose rights that we have held . . . are incorporated, but that other 
‘advanced’ nations do not recognize—from the exclusionary rule to the 
Establishment Clause.”255  
All sides should have recognized, however, that the civilization 
standard is not an invocation of foreign law.  References to other 
countries can be severed from the civilization standard of Due Process 
without losing its substance.  In Palko, Cardozo made only a vague 
reference to “narrow and provincial” views of other legal systems while 
discussing Due Process standards in the language of majestic law.256  
Instead, he stressed that the rights to a grand jury and trial by jury “are 
not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty,” and that “[t]o 
abolish them is not to violate a ‘principle of justice so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental.’”257 He asked whether the state had subjected the 
appellant to “a hardship so acute and shocking that our policy will not 
endure it?” and whether it had violated “those ‘fundamental principles 
 
 251 Id. at 327. 
 252 Id. at 326−27 
 253 Id. at 326.  
 254 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 781−82 (original emphasis).  
 255 Id. at 800−01. 
 256 Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 257 Id. 
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of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political 
institutions’?”258 
Consider also the language preceding Justice Moody’s reference to 
civilized countries in Twining, by which he contrasted the morality of 
Due Process with the mere utility of the Self-Incrimination Clause. 
Even if the historical meaning of due process of law and the 
decisions of this court did not exclude the privilege [against 
self-incrimination] from it, it would be going far to rate it as an 
immutable principle of justice which is the inalienable 
possession of every citizen of a free government.  Salutary as 
the principle may seem to the great majority, it cannot be 
ranked with the right to hearing before condemnation, the 
immunity from arbitrary power not acting by general laws, 
and the inviolability of private property.  The wisdom of the 
exemption has never been universally assented to since the 
days of Bentham; many doubt it to-day, and it is best defended 
not as an unchangeable principle of universal justice, but as a 
law proved by experience to be expedient.259  
Far from invoking foreign law as authority, Moody framed the question 
as one of universal assent to immutable principles of universal justice.  
Similarly, in the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad case, the 
reference to “all temperate and civilized governments” is just another 
way of saying that the right to compensation is “a settled principle of 
universal law,” reflecting “a deep and universal sense of its justice.”260  
The civilization standard of Due Process is a moral norm, not only a legal 
one and not at all a question of foreign law. 
Attempting to straddle the descriptive-prescriptive divide, Chicago 
argued that “if it is possible to imagine any civilized legal system that 
does not recognize a particular right, then the Due Process Clause does 
not make that right binding on the States.”261  The city seems to have 
understood that it was advancing a moral argument, but it ought to have 
left imaginary civilizations out of it.  Had it done so, it would not have 
fallen into one of the standard metaethical traps that impede majestic 
law.  Our moral commitments are not imaginary, but this is precisely 
how the proponents of the subjective stop portray them.   
 
 
 258 Id. at 328 
 259 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 113 (1908). 
 260 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 238 (1897). 
 261 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 780−81 (original emphasis). 
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As matters stand, there is no way to undo Heller for the foreseeable 
future.262  After McDonald, the Court’s insistence on jot-for-jot 
incorporation moots any direct appeal to Due Process in subsequent 
gun control cases from the states, including, of course, the civilization 
standard.  In future Due Process cases in other areas of the law, however, 
the civilization standard might be revived.  Some of the language in 
Palko, Twining, and Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad is archaic 
and not entirely persuasive.  It is possible, however, to avoid the 
language of the old cases that suggests moral realism or 
nineteenth-century formalist jurisprudence.  The “immutable principle 
of justice” standard stated in Twining is viable because “immutable” 
means “unchanging,” not “transcendent” or “eternal.”  The “principle of 
natural equity” formulation in Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad 
is not viable, because it comes too close to the language of moral realism 
and natural law jurisprudence.263  The frank use of moral language will 
always draw a subjective stop, but the practice of majestic law in the 
area of Due Process would restore much of its former power.   
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The subjective stop has been used in a persistent campaign, 
spanning decades, to hollow out moral commitments in law, on the 
authority of a primitive emotivism.  Majestic law, in contrast, is 
defensible by means of at least two metaethical theories that embrace 
the subjectivity of moral commitments.  If law students, lawyers, 
scholars, and judges were to abjure the subjective stop, this would open 
the way for the recovery of majestic law.  This path will have to be trod 
carefully, but to insist that it is a dead end unjustifiably empties the law 
of a wide range of moral commitments: not only integrity, dignity, 
decency, autonomy, freedom of conscience, freedom from cruelty, and 
moral proportionality in punishment but ultimately justice and fairness.   
Instead of assuming a primitive emotivism, we can see moral 
commitments as expressions of support for moral systems and not 
merely expressions of isolated moral norms and judgments.  The former 
are adjudicated differently from the latter.  We can rationally reject 
moral errors on the ground that they express support for moral 
systems⎯such as a childish set of moral commitments⎯that we cannot 
 
 262 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognizing an individual’s 
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms). 
 263 See John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 4 ( Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) 
(natural law “cannot be reduced to, or deduced from, the principles of natural science 
or metaphysics, logic, or any craft”). 
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rationally accept if we hope to have a healthy society.  We can also 
attribute the subjectivity of moral commitments to the fact that we 
project them onto an austere external world, but with the 
understanding that this world of fact puts constraints on what we can 
do and believe for moral reasons.  These projected values also have their 
own logic to constrain them, and we can earn the right to speak frankly 
and authoritatively about the moral commitments of law by living up to 
the epistemic virtues ordinarily associated with empirical inquiry.  
Either or both of these metaethical theories⎯for they do not seem 
to be mutually exclusive⎯allows us to claim moral rationality and 
moral truth for law.  Moral choices in criminal law, such as the rejection 
of a presidential cult of personality, are rational at a systemic level, so 
that a subjective evaluation of the crime committed in the service of the 
cult is not disqualified from legal reasoning about mistake of law as a 
defense to crime.  The same is true for most of the quite majestic 
standards of Due Process.  We can, for example, bar the norms of 
uncivilized legal systems from ours on the ground that they are wrong, 
not only for us but for anyone.  We also recognize epistemic virtues 
specific to law that combine with the epistemic virtues of empirical 
inquiry to justify claims to truth in law, even though truth is something 
that we project onto the world.  A punishment is indecent if that is what 
an honest debate conducted in the rich, unreduced terms of decency 
concludes⎯even though any such conclusion requires the less rich, 
more formal imprimatur of law.  And if we conclude someday that this 
legal rule is in error, the error will be discovered and debated in the 
same unreduced moral terms.  No meaningless pretensions to 
“objectivity”⎯most notably imagined reductions of prescriptions to 
descriptions⎯are required. 
Majestic law does not entail disregarding the limitations of 
federalism, the separation of powers, or basic rule of law principles.  
Because all other institutional constraints on law and legal reasoning 
remain in force, the rejection of the subjective stop safely licenses a 
deeper engagement with moral commitments in law than we have had 
for decades.  While this Article has argued that we can recover majestic 
law, the reason we ought to recover it was stated eloquently by a 
philosopher whose work we have noted only in passing, but whose 
emotivism could be used to bolster the case for majestic law.  Of moral 
ideals, Charles L. Stevenson wrote this:   
For these ideals, like all other attitudes, are not imposed upon 
human nature by esoteric forces; they are a part of human 
nature itself.  If they are to become a more integral part of it, 
they must be fought for.  They must be fought for with the 
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words “right” and “wrong,” else these attitude-molding 
weapons will be left to the use of opponents.264 




 264 STEVENSON, supra note 120, at 110. 
